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FAITH IN THE REPUBLIC: A FRANCES LEWIS
LAW CENTER CONVERSATION
BY STANLEY HAUERWAS*,

SANIoRD LEviNsON**, MARK

V.

TuSHNET***

AND OTBERS****

Introduction
Shaffer: Our principals have spoken elsewhere, and published recently,
on compelling modem questions about community-a theme the Washington
and Lee University Frances Lewis Law Center and the Law Review have
addressed in a series of lectures and colloquia.' Stanley Hauerwas works from
a vivid theology of Israel and of the church as a formative and prophetic
community within American society. Sanford Levinson, lawyer, law teacher,
and student of politics, notably in his new book, ConstitutionalFaith, writes
about an American, perhaps republican, community. Mark Tushnet, who is
probably the most lucid and penetrating of the legal scholars identified with
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, has lately given particular attention to
what he has called the law of religion.
Each of these prolific scholars has noticed and remarked on the work of
the others. Tushnet and Levinson often appear together in symposia and
panel presentations. Lewis LaRue, the Director of the Law Center, and I
noticed last year that Levinson and Tushnet had not yet addressed Hauerwas'
singular political theology, and Hauerwas had not addressed their constitutional jurisprudence. We invited them to begin doing so at Washington and
Lee. This conversation is the result of their generous willingness and interest
in such a project. It contains no formal, central "paper." It is, as it was, a
lively, spontaneous conversation. Each of the principals offered to the others
recent, focused written work that he believed spoke to a mutual interest in
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questions about community in modem America; 2 and each is evidently familiar
with the scholarship of the others. The conversation was recorded in the Law
Center on December 11, 1987. 3

Levinson: I thought I might start by reading two pages from the manuscript of my book, ConstitutionalFaith. You'll see, I think, that there is a
point to beginning with this. It is from a discussion of loyalty oaths. It's not
an argument so much as a meditation on what we do with notions of loyalty.
I quite deliberately never conclude with, "Yes, we should have loyalty oaths,"
or "No, we shouldn't," though I suppose that most people who read my
meditations don't like loyalty oaths. I am certainly a part of the liberal
spectrum that grew up in an era where the very notion of loyalty oaths was
extremely bothersome.
Of course, I am not really discussing the kinds of loyalty oaths that drew
the fire in the 50's and 60's-anticommunist loyalty oaths and stuff like that.
But I think generally loyalty oaths have a bad press, so by suggesting that
there might be something to be said for them, I suppose I make an argument.
But there's obviously a certain waffling on whether they are a good thing or
not.
I also try to raise the question of whether there is something about
political oaths that bothers us. Or is the difficulty with loyalty oaths in
general? That brings up things like credal affirmations in religious contexts,
or marriage vows. Why is it that formal marriage ceremonies remain popular,
even among people who would quickly denounce political loyalty oaths? In
any case, I conclude by quoting Michael Walzer, which I almost always do
in discussions of pluralism, on how pluralism creates notions of contingent
commitments, not hierarchical commitments. I believe that loyalty oaths are
an attempt to hedge against the Walzerian. kind of contingency: the state
wants unconditional loyalty, a spouse wants unconditional loyalty, and God
presumably wants unconditional loyalty.4 There is an obvious problem: What

2. Prof. Hauerwas offered A Christian Critique of Christian America (unpublished),
presented to the Section on Law and Religion, Association of American Law Schools, in 1986
[hereinafter Hauerwas, A Christian Critique]; Freedom of Religion: A Subtle Temptation (unpublished), presented in a symposium at Loyola University, in Los Angeles, in 1986 [hereinafter
Hauerwas, Freedom of Religion]; and S. Hauerwas & D. Burrell, From System to Story: An
Alternative Patternfor Rationality in Ethics, in TRuTHFuLNs AND TRAGEDY (1977).
Prof. Levinson offered the manuscript of his then forthcoming book, CoN SmruioNAL FArm
(1988).
Prof. Tushnet offered two law review articles, Community and Fairness in Democratic
Theory: A Comment on 'Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory,' 15 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv.
417 (1987) and Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Loy. L. REv. 221
(1987) [hereinafter Tushnet, Religion and Theories].
3. The recording was made by Thomas Williams and transcribed and copy-edited by
Margaret Williams and Kathryn Edgell. Professors Tushnet and Shaffer edited the transcript for
publication.
4. M. WAi2ER, PoliticalAlienation and Military Service in OBuATONS (1970).
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if those loyalties conflict? (I also discuss in the book Justice Brennan's rather
offhand comment that there is no real conflict between his legal obligations
and his obligations as a Roman Catholic, because he took an oath thirty
years ago to support the Constitution of the United States. That kind of
settled it. It seems to me there are problems here.) These are the two pages:
It is not only the family, or the lure of sensual pleasure, that threatens
necessary commitment to the polity.... Religion itself also makes
obvious claims of sovereignty as against other social institltions. The
Protestant theologian Stanley Hauerwas has recently criticized an
overemphasis in American thought on the formal freedom of religion,
by arguing that this freedom has in significant measure been purchased by a diminution of the willingness of believers to present
"gospel as truth" and a concomitant weakening of "a church that
has a people capable of saying no to the state, or indeed capable of
challenging the state." This is obviously not a vision of religion that
neatly divides the world into the unantagonistic realms of God and
Caesar or, even better, from the perspective of Caesar exhibits the
willingness to use religion as an undergirding of the legitimacy of the
state. It is the possibility of potentially radical anti-statist religion
that draws the fire of a conservative philosopher, Nicholas Capaldi,
who apparently supports the toleration by the state of religious
"subcultures" only if they are no threat to the legitimacy of the
tolerating state. "There is nothing wrong in helping to subsidize
religious schools in general, especially given that such schools have
produced model citizens. What is not acceptable is tolerating religious
groups who refuse to recognize the moral and political sovereignty
of the secular community by, for example, refusing to salute the
flag." There is obviously a fundamental gulf between the views of
Hauerwas and Capaldi, a gulf expressed, among other ways, in the
language of sovereignty and creedal affirmation. A staple of political
theory following the development of the notion of political sovereignty
by Bodin is that there cannot be two sovereigns within a polity. By
definition sovereignty is an exclusive status. Yet the major Western
religions also celebrate God as an alternative sovereign to the claims
of the State, however much the claims are dissipated by doctrines
like the Talmudic injunction to follow the local law or by Christian
doctrines about God and Caesar. Dissipation does not mean elimination, as revealed by the theology of Hauerwas or the behavior of
the Jehovah's Witness children seemingly condemned by Capaldi. 5
That seems one thing that certainly the three of us have written about.
Mark has written very eloquently about religious pluralism, particularly in
the piece that he gave at Loyola,6 which is very personal as well as eloquent.

5. S. LVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArm 118-19 (1988).
6. Tushnet, Religion and Theories, supra note 2.
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He and I share the same socio-cultural identification, whether or not it is a
religious identification. I certainly not only thought it was an unusually
eloquent piece, but I also shared very much the views that Mark was
expressing. I assume the rest of the day we can talk about lots of other
things, including Protestant and Catholic constitutionalism and all the other
stuff that I'm interested in, but I thought this might be a way of getting us
started. It's the most immediate consequence of Tom's bringing me into
contact with Stan.
Hauenvas: I'd like to hear Mark respond to Sandy. In some ways I have
a sense that Sandy thinks that these issues are ultimately resolvable in some
way within the constitutional faith, and Mark's view is that they are not.
Tushnet: In framing these issues there are two things that I would like
to get on the table. One is that it's very easy to have an image of the
attractiveness of religious diversity when the implicit models for the diverse
religious communities are what I'll call attractive religious communities-the
Jehovah's Witnesses or the Amish in Wisconsin, and the like. I think it's
important to keep in mind that perhaps one reason the image is attractive is
that we regard these people as so marginal to the exercise of power in this
society that they are not threatening. They are rendering unto Caesar from
the point of view of Caesar-sure, so long as they don't do anything, it's
fine to have them around, it's nice to have them around; you feel good
about it. But if they begin to do something, which is how the Jehovah's
Witnesses were viewed in the 1940s, then it becomes more troubling. Part of
my problem is that it is not easy for me, given my socialization into nice
ideas about religious pluralism, to come up with unattractive religionsMoonies, or the Jews for Jesus, or something like that. We've talked about
Iran, where from my point of view, an unattractive religion is powerful.
Maybe that becomes an interesting way to frame the issue, so that we can
then see exactly what's at stake.
The second point is the point that I was framing in the Loyola essay,
which is that the stance of Jews in the United States is of a minority facing
a regular routine-so accepted as to be thoughtless, not in any invidious
sense but just something that goes on without thinking-of the exercise of a
Christian religion of some sort. Now Stanley can get us into discussions about
what sort of religion that represents, but, from our point of view, it's the
other exercising power on the basis of religion. In response to Stan's question,
it seems to me that that experience leads me to think that the opposition is
permanent, not reconcilable.
Hauerwas: Legally or socially?
Tushnet: I think probably both. Part of my difficulty in that response is
that it's awfully difficult for me to separate those domains. That is, I suppose,
expressed by my criticism of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 7 in which she has a formulation which says "I, a Christian, am going
to look at this from the point of view of reasonable Jews," and doesn't do

7. 465 U.S. 668, 685-693 (1984).
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it, and at some level can't do it. The social phenomenon is that she can't do
it. That translates into the application of a legal formula that has a certain
degree of attractiveness, in an unattractive way.
Hauerwas: Let me try to put the issue the way I see it in terms of the
legal and the social-they are, I admit, very hard to distinguish-but how
the distinction works in a kind of ironical way. What I'm mad at is not
liberalism per se, or liberal political theory and/or jurisprudence, but who
I'm mad at is Christians. And the reason I'm mad at them is because they
fail to see that the very forms of liberal tolerance they took up, in trying to
provide safeguards to stop Christian envy against the Jews from becoming
too politically damaging for Jews and other religious groups in this country,
ironically undercut the seriousness of Christian convictions that were necessary
to form limited states to begin with. So, ironically, you have it work out in
all kinds of anomalies in the legal situation, like creches on New England
court yards. But this is not the legal system, per se; it's the legal system
reinforced by an increasingly self-fulfilling liberal political system that says
that religion is what you do with your private time.
As a result Christianity cannot any longer maintain the kinds of disciplined
communities that are necessary to keep the state limited. (I don't believe in
constitutions keeping the state limited. I think you can do anything you want
to with constitutions.) As a result, the political realities and social realities
are such that the very means that we used, that we invented in terms of the
Constitution, to try to ensure that there would be a so-called religious
pluralism, to protect religious pluralism, in fact only undercuts the kind of
discipline that is necessary for religious communities to form a people capable
of saying no to the state. That's how I see the problem and that's the reason
why I find the situation unresolved, given Sandy's way of putting it.
Tushnet: Well, I wonder what your response is to the position Kent
Greenawalt is attempting to articulate,' that a disciplined Christian community
could act on its, or some portion of its, Christian commitment. This is a
social program of liberal Protestantism, motivated explicitly on religious
grounds, and defended on religious grounds, not on utilitarian grounds or
anything like that, or on general liberal grounds, but on Christian grounds.
But one element of the discipline of the community is that the remainder of
the Christian program-the specifically Christian elements-would be advanced by means other than use of state help.
Hauerwas: Yes, I'd be sympathetic with that.
Tushnet: So the Roman Catholic bishops' pastoral letter on economic
justice9 is, without worrying about the theological quibbles about what it is,
an okay thing?
Hauerwas: Oh, of course. For example, take the issue of the Roman
Catholic bishops' pastoral letter on nuclear weapons.' 0
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONWICnONS AND POITICAL CHOICE (1988).
9. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: A PASTORAL
LErrER ON CATHOUC SocIAL TEAcaINa AND = U.S. ECONOMY (1986).
10. NATIONAL CON-ERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEAcE: GOD'S PROM-

8. K.
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There they have the claim, based on just-war grounds, that if we are not
moving significantly toward the elimination of nuclear weapons-and it would
be interesting how they interpret this recent treaty-then the Roman Catholic
faithful cannot any longer have their conscience ordered by the state, or even
serve in the United States military. That could be very interesting: Would
the United States of America, if the Roman Catholic bishops came to the
empirical judgment that we are not moving significantly toward reduction
and elimination of nuclear weapons, and so Roman Catholic people can no
longer serve in the United States military, be happy with that one? Is that
going to be a freedom of religion issue? Now that would be interesting. Of
course we know this will not happen. And the reason we know this will not
happen is because the Roman Catholic Church has become Protestantized in
America. Catholic people, because they want to use condoms when they have
sex, now will no longer listen to the bishops tell them that they cannot use
atomic weapons. The bishops lost the disciplined community over sex and
therefore cannot maintain it over nuclear weapons. I want them to maintain
it over both. Partly this is a result of the fact that Roman Catholics have
become good American denominationalists, thinking that the church is but
another free association, rather than a called, disciplined community. That's
what you'd expect to have happened. In that sense, they aren't clearly on
the Pope's side. I think that American Catholicism has been deeply out of
step with what Roman Catholicism has been about.
Tushnet: I wonder if we could use that example at least to begin to talk
about the unattractive faith-community problem.
Hauerwas: I'm trying to make Roman Catholicism an unattractive faith.
Tushnet: Right. I understand that. Again, as I understand it, there are
quarrels within the Roman Catholic Church on this issue. But let's take the
positions about sex that you've raised as constitutive of Roman Catholicism.
And let's take it as a given that, independent of the association of those
positions with a faith community, they have almost nothing to commend
them. Then what do we do about the faith community that is unattractive?
Hauerwas: My response is, "Who's we, white man?" I think this really
goes to the heart of the issue. When people read one of my papers, like the
one on freedom of religion,"1 they say, "Gee, even if you are right, what are
we going to do?" I say I don't have the slightest damned idea. Why do I
have to come up with a solution? I mean, I'm just trying to survive. Jeff
[Powell] made a nice point after a class I'm teaching in Christian Ethics in
America that he's been taking. He said, "Just to listen to how you teach
makes a difference. It shows how socialized I am in the law, because in the
law you are always wanting to know, 'How can I make it work?' Of course,
religious ethicists were trained in that way for years. I always said that
basically what Christian social ethics tried to do in this country was to

IsE AND OuR RESPONSE: A PASTORAL LESTmR ON WAR AND PEACE, Publication No. 863

ington, D.C., 1983).
11. Hauerwas, Freedom of Religion, supra note 2.

(Wash-
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formulate a social ethic that our kind of secretary of state would use if we
finally got power. We can have a Christian foreign policy, and of course we
got it in Alexander Haig. But I just don't think that way. When you say
what do we do, I don't know who's "we." I'm not trying to think how to
make it work.
Tushnet: So there are two ways of formulating the problem. One is that
we (that is, we here) could try to imagine a situation in which this-with all
the qualifications-this unattractive faith community is exercising coercive
authority. You can say it's coercion and take an anti-coercion position
generally. The other position is the lawyers' perspective, the legal academic's
perspective, translated into a religious context. We are people who attempt
to speak truth to power, in some sense. Thefe are people on the margin who,
for whatever reasons, listen to what legal academics say and, on the margins,
can be influenced by their suggestions. (Where the margin is, is obviously
something we can talk about.) But, from the point of view of us, as legal
academics, the what-do-we-do question'is: We're just trying to survive. I
mean it, isn't this true of Christians?
Hauerwas: Mark, you're still trying to form power in a way that I'm
not. The law is much more essentially related to power than those of us that
are in the theological business, working out of the church, are-even though
the church would clearly like the power that the law has, which it traditionally
had, but which it has now lost. But now we try to piggy-back it on you as
one way of doing it, but it doesn't work very well for us.
Let's do the thing about coercion, though. I think that the whole thing
about the Unification Church is brainwashing. I was very unsympathetic with
the argument that the Moonies were coercing people. Indeed, a lot of what
it sounded like they were doing was like early Christian catechetical formation
in the Roman Empire. We were clearly brainwashers and the Romans would
have clearly seen that. So I regard that allegation about Moonie brainwashing
as the continuing hegemony of a Christian culture trying to resist a new
powerful sect which, as a matter of fact, has a very interesting counter-story
into which it initiates people. Christians claim Moonies are brainwashing so
they do not have to deal with the issue of truth.
I used to teach a marriage course at Notre Dame, and I would read
them a letter in it that said, "Gee our kid was doing well-gone to all the
right schools-had a bright military career-looked like he could have done
well in the political arena. Then he got involved with some near-Eastern sect
and he says he doesn't want anything to do with us because we're people of
the world. He's never going to marry. He's going to be completely subservient
to this sect, and we don't know what to do. We're just heartsick." I asked
who'd write that letter or what it was about. Students would say it was from
a family writing about their son's conversion to Unification or to Hare
Krishna or something like that. It's the letter of a fourth century Roman
senator and his wife about their son's conversion to Christianity.
Levinson: My hunch, though, is that most of the "we" that comes from
the liberal academy share that toleration toward the Unification Church.
With the deprogramming stuff, and the cult, it came naturally to many of
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us to say, "Well, they're just like any other religious community-another
intense ideology in the community." I don't think they are viewed as an
attractive sect, but I don't think most of us in the academic community know
enough about them, or have enough experience with them, to have views
about anything more than what is presumed to be a political agenda of the
Moonies.
I think the best example of an unattractive native American religious
group, where there is very high valence, at least among some of the people
we know, is the Mormon Church, particularly that wing of unreformed
Mormonism that continues to believe in polygamy and educates its children
to maintain this. I think many of the people we know find that highly
unattractive, and that has triggered a very interesting debate about whether
you use the power of the state to smash the unattractive religious group.
Certainly I think the whole treatment of the Mormons in American history
has been a very interesting problem within the Christian community. I don't
know to this day how much Mormons are viewed as Christians by orthodox
Christians. Certainly the Mormons had to change church doctrine in order
to get even liberal tolerance. What obviously makes the unreformed Mormons
so interesting is that they reject the validity of the antipolygamy revelation.
Hauerwas: My view about the Unificationists is that they are Calvinism
gone East, transformed by Confucianism, come back to save the West.
Because of that I regard them as particularly perverse; and, as Christians, I
think we ought to clearly brand them for what they are-heretics-and have
nothing to do with them. I think that Mormons are a more complex case
insofar as they continue to maintain the validity of the Christian scripture
but by deeply misinterpreting it. I think you can maintain a certain kind of
discussion with them, but I don't see why the legal system should regard
Mormons and Moonies any differently than it regards Christians.
Levinson: A quick answer to that is that the unreformed Mormons come
into the legal situation because they wish to violate laws prohibiting bigamy.
Hauerwas: We Christians do not live in a monogamous culture. We live
in a culture of serial polygamy. Contemporary Christians do not believe in
monogamy. What Christians believe in is that you can be married to more
than one person; you just need to do it serially. And this is certainly not
what the church traditionally meant by "covenant fidelity in marriage." How
the legal system reflects that, I think, is a real issue. Most Protestants don't
even know what marriage is about, since most of them have accepted romantic
conceptions of what marriage is about that are based upon the false assumptions of liberalism. Namely, that somehow or other, love has to do with
marriage in an intrinsic way. I take it that the church has always maintained
that people should love one another even in marriage, which is a little
different perspective. I'm for that but it puts a lot of burden on marriage.
Orthodox Christian views about marriage are so out of sync with the
kind of general cultural presuppositions, that Christians think that they hold
on Christian grounds, that the issue is very hard for them to negotiate. I
cannot see any rationale for this society to maintain strong views about
marriage, anymore than I can see why this society should entertain strong
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views about suicide. I think there is no reason at all that we should try to
prevent suicide, given our natural presuppositions.
Which brings me back to the hardest case of an unattractive religion,
and that is, of course, Jim Jones and what was going on in California with
that kind of extraordinary evangelical Protestant sectarianism-the formation
of those people who ultimately ended up in Guiana killing themselves. On
the whole, we gave them freedom of religion. He [Jones] even was courted
by the politicians of California and various places. It was very ambiguous,
and looked very socially progressive, and that kind of thing. I regard those
people in Jonestown as victims to liberal tolerance. We are all ready to
condemn Jerry Falwell because he appears intolerant. Liberal Christians can't
wait to get on the bandwagon to condemn someone like Falwell. But they
just stood back on Jones, not saying anything about the extraordinary
perversity of what was going on there, because, you know, he was doing
good for poor folks. I regard that as just perverse. But liberal culture has
no reason to stop Jones and Jonestowns-does it? We're going to have to
grant them freedom of religion.
Tushnet: As a matter of stated law, at least, it is possible to develop
permissible legal techniques of controlling what happened there; however,
you want to categorize Jonestown, on the model of laws against bigamy, as
a method of controlling the unreformed Mormon community. Now, I take
it the problem with that is that (with all sorts of qualifications) the liberal
principle that authorizes that degree of intolerance also authorizes more
substantial degrees of intolerance with respect to less unattractive religions.
The problem from the point of view of liberalism is not so much that it
lacks the resources to authorize intervention in a Jonestown situation, but
that the resources it has also authorize other, more problematic interventions.
Hauerwas: You think that there are legitimate interventions that give us
the right to say that polygamy is wrong, that we can intervene in that legally?
Tushnet: As a matter of stated law.
Hauerwas: As a matter of stated law, but I'm saying that that stated
law is irrational.
Powell: No, I think it's perfectly rational. We have a problem about
what we mean about liberalism, but I take it to mean we're describing current
liberalism, whatever it is that late 20th-century liberal constitutional lawyers
mean by it, not 19th-century liberalism. I think it's perfectly rational, because
one of the great accomplishments of liberal constitutionalism is to say that
state power is to be invoked on behalf of the rights of individuals; and the
rights of individuals viewed from a liberal perspective in a polygamy situation,
or in the Jonestown situation, are being violated, and state power ought to
be invoked to protect them.
Hauerwas: What right of an individual is being violated?
Powell: The right of women not to be in subservient kinds of situations.
I think that is part of what liberalism today means.
Hauerwas: I've read some of the biographies of those families, and the
women didn't feel like they were in subservient situations.
Powell: That's not relevant, Stan. That's like asking black people in 1953
if they feel that segregation-if they would say, "Oh, segregation is oppressing
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me." That's not, in the end, dispositive. The way I would answer the question
Stan was posing is, "Yes, it's deeply correct for the liberal state to intervene
and to break up communities which are violating the liberal state's view of
how people ought to relate."
Levinson: I think what you've got, though, is the obvious contradiction
between freedom of contract notions and notions of false consciousness as
preventing true freedom of contract. So there is a connection. I think there's
a linkage between contemporary liberalism and old-fashioned liberalism. All
of it is autonomy-based. I think the most satisfying defense of intervention
is just the one you've given, that the individuals entering these contracts are
[should be] truly autonomous. But if it then is the function of the liberal
state to create truly autonomous individuals, who will we then allow to enter
into whatever contracts they want? I think that the problem is obvious-in
terms of who gets to define what counts as false consciousness.
Powell: The liberal state.
Hauerwas: And of course it does that coercively.
Powell: Yes.
Hauerwas: For example, just on these grounds, it seems to me that the
Roman Catholic marriage doctrine is deeply coercive. It is only false consciousness on the part-as feminists will tell us-of Roman Catholic women
to believe that they should pledge themselves in marriage for a lifetime. That
is coercive; it is non autonomous. They ought to be able to wake up every
morning and decide whether they are going to continue this bad marriage.
So, for the Roman Catholic Church to suggest that they will only marry
people that are willing to enter into this covenant for a lifetime-that is the
exact equivalent to polygamy. And they should not have recognition by public
law of that. Right? Indeed I would think that women could start bringing
wrongful marriage suits against the Roman Catholic Church and get civil
damages. Is that right?
Powell: Well, there of course the liberal state hasn't decided that it
disagrees with lifetime marriage officially. If you want to do it for a lifetime
fine, if you don't-it's not like polygamy.
Levinson: But here we get into the metaphysics of neutrality. By the
state offering the option and moving toward no-fault divorce statutes, and
trying to make it as easy as possible for bad marriages, as defined by the
parties, or indeed as defined by one party, to dissolve as easily as possible,
that, against a background of critique of divorce, has to count as relative
approval.
Tushnet: We actually know that Stan's example is right when we examine
the get cases, which do not quite seek civil damages against a church for
maintaining a rule of lifetime marriage, but come quite close to that. They
do what they can to undermine, to directly confront, the church's commitment
to lifetime marriage.
Levinson: For those who aren't familiar with orthodox Judaism, you
might explain the get.
Tushnet: It's complicated, but in the context of a divorce in a Jewish
family, the divorce is permissible. The former wife is not allowed to remarry
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unless the former husband does something, which is to provide a get, a
religious document. This has created a fair number of problems within the
Jewish community in New York. The New York courts developed a rule that
in effect coerced the former husband into providing the get. The New York
legislature responded by imposing a condition that requires the performance
of religious duties necessary to dissolve the marriage religiously, so that the
husband could not obtain the civil divorce, which quite often he would want,
unless he agreed to perform the religious ceremony, which, for a variety of
complicated reasons, he might not want to do.
Powell: But that's very close to the model that Stan was worried about.
Hauerwas: My response is to say, "Don't tell me that the liberal state is
a neutral state." I regard that-given Jeff's justification-as a state with a
regnant, coercive ideology about what people ought to be that fundamentally
is about the destruction of religious communities. Jews bought into that
liberal state to keep Christians off their necks, for all good reasons, but it
seems to me, ironically, that the liberal state is going about the destruction
of the Jewish community, along with the destruction of the Christian community, exactly because Christians and Jews don't care about autonomy.
And they rightly do not.
Tom and I had a colleague at the University of Notre Dame one time,
and I was talking to him and I said, "Isn't it about time for Sam to be barmitzvahed?" And he said, "Oh, I'm not going to bar-mitzvah Sam. I'm
going to let him get older and make up his own mind." And I said, "Oh
hell, raise him to be an atheist. At least that shows you've got some
convictions. What's all this autonomy stuff? Make up your own mind! How
in the hell can you make up your mind to be a Jew? That's stupid. Here
you've had thousands of ancestors willing to die at the hands of Christian
persecutors so that you as a matter of fact can continue to live faithful to
the community, and you're going to let Sam make up his own stupid little
mind. That's stupid. If what I say about the Jews is true, then, by God, you
ought to form him in the community."
Shaffer: The next year Sam had his bar mitzvah.
Hauerwas: Jews, on the whole, in America, have been able to survive
on the basis of Protestant prejudice. It's been very useful in terms of
maintaining intensive group commitment. But the question is whether you'll
be able to survive the tolerance sponsored by the liberal state, as it becomes
more and more the ethic that Jews and Christians alike seize upon.
Tushnet: I don't believe in autonomy either, and so I think that the
liberal formulation is ultimately unsatisfying. The strategic question you raise
about what is the best way to preserve our religious community is a difficult
one. But I'm not sure we're in a position to say a whole lot about that. I
am interested in the question raised by a lot of your formulations. Those
may be formulations designed for rhetorical purposes. In the formulations,
the terms "truth claims" and "faith communities" or "religious communities"
have positive value, wherever they are located. And I don't believe that.
Indeed I would think that, with qualifications relating to the nature of the
scope of the tradition within which the faith community is located, people
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in faith communities couldn't believe that. That is, the adherent to unreformed
Mormonism doesn't accept the proposition that the Moonies are making truth
claims. They are constituting a community around them, but it is a false
community, because they are false.
Hauerwas: Right. So is Jones. Why can't I say that?
Tushnet: You can. One of the things that gives your formulations
rhetorical power is that truth claims are positively valued. You get the
rhetorical power because it appears as if truth claims are positively valued
wherever they occur. And you don't believe that.
Hauerwas: That's right. I certainly don't believe that. I don't believe it
descriptively, obviously.
Tushnet: Right, but you don't believe it-well, you can't believe it
because, to you, I don't have the truth. I make truth claims and I have a
community that it's organized around, but they're wrong.
Hauerwas: My community is wrong?
Tushnet: No, mine.
Hauerwas: I believe that Israel is the promised people of God and as
such it is a community of truth that Christians could not do without.
Therefore, I would certainly validate that, from within my own community.
Powell: Talking about an orthodox Christian view of Judaism is not an
easy thing precisely because, from a Christian viewpoint, Judaism is not
exactly like just any other religion. The easy one is to say that Buddhism
makes truth claims that are simply false...
Hauerwas: Well, I don't know.
Powell: .. .from our standpoint.
Hauerwas: I'm a nonfoundationalist, 12 but I regard nonfoundationalism
as a necessary position of a modernity that has primarily been the result of
Descartes. Rorty is only possible because of Descartes. The difficulty with
Rorty 3 is he forgot that there is a good deal of tradition prior to Descartes.
So I'm not going to give up. I have strong commitments to certain kinds of
metaphysical realism that are still part and parcel of scholastic philosophy,
which I think has been deeply misconstrued and misunderstood since Descartes.' 4 Because I remain a nonfoundationalist within modernity doesn't

12. Foundationalism usually is identified with the project of Descartes to solve metaphysical
and epistemological issues by finding a fixed Archimedean point that is absolute, nonrelativistic,
ahistorical, and not subject to doubt. For a good discussion of current debates about foundationalism, see R. BERNSTEIN, BEYoND OBEcTIvIM AND RELATrvisM: SCIENCE, HERmENIUrrCS AND
PRAxis (1983). See Hauerwas, A Christian Critique,supra note 2. Hauerwas, Freedom of Religion,
supra note 2, discusses Rorty's The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in Tir ViRGINIA
STATUTE FOR REmIGIOUS FREEDoM (M. Peterson & R. Vaughn eds. 1987).
13. R. RORTY, PHImosopHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES
oF PRAGMATISM (1982). This criticism of Rorty first was made by Alasdair Maclntyre.
14. For a defense of the kind of "realism" I am willing to defend, that is, a realism that
requires the acknowledgment that all claims of truth are tradition dependent, see A. MAcINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE, WICH RATnONA=rrY? (1988). In particular, see Chapter XVIII.
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mean I have to give up on truth claims that, I can continue to assume, have
some way of providing us with ways of talking across communities.
I regard foundationalism and liberalism as the result of Christian bad
faith. Christianity wanted to show itself to be a universal religion and we
thought by being a universal religion that meant that we had the truth that
everyone really knew but just had to be awakened to. So natural theology 5
became our mode, and when we went to other societies we assumed that all
we were telling them was something that they already knew and therefore
they would just naturally respond. And when they didn't naturally respond
then we said they must be morally obtuse and rationally unclear and so we
could coerce them since, as a matter of fact, this was just the universal truth
we were trying to make them live in accordance with.
What I say that does is forget that intrinsic to the Christian faith is the
assumption that our truth is a truth that only comes through witness. People
forget that witness presupposes that you are telling people something that
they haven't known. It's not just confirming something they already know.
Our truth is something that they haven't known. It is primarily the result of
compellingness of lives that puts the world together in that way. My sense
of truth is not one that can avoid the necessity of witness in that regard, so
I have a nonfoundationalist account which I think is appropriate to the
Christian presumption that witness is the only way that the truth goes forward
in the world.
And the witness-because of the material content itself-must be noncoercive. It's not because we are just good, tolerant people. It's because, as
a matter of fact, the very thing that you are saying about God and God's
love as manifest in Jesus of Nazareth means that the only way that one
learns to follow this way of life truthfully is through taking it up as a calling,
not as something you have been coerced into. But that is the claim about
the truth of the way the world is, that you must work in it in that way.
Now then, the problem is separating that account of truth from liberal
tolerance. It got confused with liberal tolerance very quickly in this society
and liberal tolerance turns out to be very coercive. So, yes, I'm going to talk
about truth, and I'll continue to talk about it. I have to. I take it that the
difficulty in America is that we want to be a society that never has to raise
questions of truth. 6 I would like to hear Mark respond to my account of

15. See Hauerwas, A Christian Critique, supra note 2.
16. Hauerwas: I wondered about Sandy titling the book CoNsTn ONAL FArm, and whether
that was taking up a peculiar sense of faith that has been with us since the 19th centurynamely, faith is arational-in the sense that we really can't show that faith has anything to do
with the way things are. Faith is a kind 6f trust, a fairly good way to go about things, but it
doesn't have any relationship to truth. Protestants made a lot of hay on that sense of faith
which I, myself, think is perverse. I don't want to have that kind of faith. I don't think
Christianity is a faith of that sort. I think faith is ultimately rational. Faith is knowledge. It's
just knowledge of a different sort, namely, of confidence in God. And so I was wonderingdid you think about what you meant by CONSTrrUioNAL FAr=?

Levinson: It comes from a sociological tradition that discusses civil religion, as Emile
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truthfulness. Because I don't want to let him just get away with saying that
it is rhetorical power that's there. I want to make you talk that language,
too.
LaRue: Would it be too much to ask you to play that record again? The
one you just went through. I leaped along with every step you made.
Hauerwas: With the Constantinian settlement, 7 Christianity wanted to
try to show that we could be a civil religion, in a way that Judaism could
not, because we were a universal faith that could command the adherence of
anyone if they just got the right information and thought hard enough about
it. Therefore, we sponsored a sense of "truth" that was a kind of correspondence theory-that just said that this is the way things are, and you
should be able to come up with it pretty quickly. That was of course against
our own best practice, since inherent in Christianity is the assumption that
in order to know the truth you must be converted. Christianity grew, not by
saying people already believe what we know-we just have to make it
explicit-but it grew by witness, and witness is primarily the power of lives.
So I'm saying that the kinds of theories of truth we sponsored had a political
purpose, namely, to underwrite our attempt to become a civil religion.
The civil religion that we created, coming primarily through western
European sources, has now primarily been secularized into forms of "liberal
rationality" which no longer have Christian support. Enlightenment liberalism
took up the great task of Christian Constantinianism, to try to show that we
are all rational people in that way, and therefore that our focus is to be
autonomous. And now that liberalism has created a new set of heretics that
we're beginning to see spring up everywhere-people like Richard Rorty and
the deconstructionists, who are calling into question the rationality and
presumptiveness of liberalism and liberal epistemologies. I take it the Critical
Legal Studies Movement in some ways is delegitimating liberal presumptions
in that way.
It's tempting for Christians to use this dissent from the Enlightenment
by saying, "Aha, isn't this wonderful, this makes way for faith again. Since
no one knows what truth is, well, hell, you might as well try being a
Christian. Or a Jew. This is wonderful. We can all get in a ball and be
irrational together." What I was saying was that it's a deep temptation, and
it's one I think one ought to resist. The fact that Rorty, et al., are questioning

Durkheim did. "Sociology of religion," as Jonathan Smith suggests, is a study dominated
primarily by those who view themselves as outside religion and are interested in how these things
work, how they function, what accounts for the rise of them, how you analyze ideas to see them
as ideologies, in cultural anthropology and sociology. I can't say that I reflected very deeply
about it, but I'm sure that's where it comes from. If people talk about civil religion from this
sociological understanding, everything followed from that. I cannot imagine writing something
called constitutional truth.
17. By "Constantinian settlement" I do not mean the actual historical point when Constantine became a member of the church, but rather the tendency, that began well before
Constantine, of Christians to use state and social power to enforce allegiance to the church. See
Hauerwas, A Christian Critique,supra note 2.
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liberal rationality doesn't mean that we should give up, as Christians, on
claims that our convictions tell you the way the world is. I certainly want to
continue to maintain that.
Reinhold Niebuhr was always fond of saying that, according to The
London Times, the only doctrine of Christian faith that is empirically
verifiable is the doctrine of original sin. Of course that's false. That is deeply
false. The fact that people are crappy is in no way equivalent to the claim
that we find ourselves, when confronted by the Gospel, to be sinners.
Christians believe that-I think they should believe, for example, that you
can only be trained to be a sinner. You must learn to discover to be a sinner.
Indeed, until the Gospel was preached you couldn't have the knowledge
necessary to know what it means to be a God-hater. That's the reason why
a pagan who has not been preached to is fundamentally, ontologically different
than one who has. So that sin is an ontological claim. It tells you the way
we are, but it depends upon witness, and this is an account of truth that
doesn't fit into the presumptiveness of liberal rationality, especially since the
Enlightenment.
But I don't want to side with the heretics within that Enlightenment
tradition of truth either. I think that rationality and truthfulness are always
tradition-dependent. Descartes and Rorty don't. And that's where I think the
difficulty is, and I want to say that you have to display how it is that you
think that truth claims can work within a tradition, and then how they can
be displayed for their power across traditions.
Tushnet: It seems to me one matter of concern which comes up in the
Critical Legal Studies stuff and in philosophical discussions around Rorty, is
that, in these discussions, the term liberalism covers at least two kinds of
things. One is a substantive doctrine about the nature of the good and a
notion of rationality.'" Then there is, independently, a political conception of
liberalism as a purely political doctrine. It seems to me that, conceived of as
a purely political doctrine, that is, as a way of letting people survive in the
world, liberalism does not raise the kinds of problems for Christian witness,
or conversion to Judaism, that would make liberalism as a political doctrine
incompatible with universalist claims of Christian witness. Although conceptually these domains, these forms of liberalism, can be kept apart, we know
that historically there was a dynamic that led from political liberalism to this
more substantive construction. The question is, was that inherent or can the
distinction be sustained?
Hauerwas: Right. Would you tell me more about what you take political
liberalism to be? Is it that we have a lot of these conspiracies out there in
the world today and we've got to figure out some way of making them live
together?
Tushnet: Basically, that's right.

18. Tushnet: Presumably the notion of rationality could be separated out as well. But for
our purposes I guess all of the substantive commitments of liberalism can be lumped together.
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Hauerwas: And therefore the Constitution is a kind of liberal political
document, articles of peace for how these people can live together?
Tushnet: Yeah.
Hauerwas: But then, how do you respond to Jeff's account of autonomy
and Sandy's underwriting it as the principle that's necessary to sustain that
political compromise?
Tushnet: The argument is that it's sustained not by notions of autonomy
but by concern for self-defense-community self-defense, if you want to do
it that way. That is, if we don't sign this mutual nonaggression agreement,
there are more of them than there are of us, so we'll get smashed. And
everybody can see these alliances as working out badly, so it's in everybody's
interestHauerwas: How do you avoid a kind of majoritarian coerciveness when
you take issues such as abortion, marriage laws, suicide-all those kinds of
issues which inextricably call forward normative presuppositions for their
resolution within any social polity? The problem is that political liberalism
wants to draw back from many normative solutions. So as a result what
happens is you get majoritarian imposition. Do you just have to live with
that?
Tushnet: It seems to me that, within the political liberal tradition, there
are concerted efforts to work out restrictions on majoritarian imposition
which have not been notably successful. And it may be that what you end
up with is majoritarianism unrestrained by principle, restrained by sociological
stuff-and also other things, but not as a matter of principle-as the best
we can do.
Hauerwas: So you should have supported Judge Bork...
Tushnet: Well, no, because he's wrong.
Hauerwas: .. .because that's his position, isn't it?
Tushnet: Yes.
Hauerwas: No one knows the truth? We just ultimately have- to be
majoritarian?
Tushnet: I think it's more complicated than that. One need not write off
these efforts within political liberalism to define some substantive goals, as
he does. His defense of majoritarianism ultimately is not that. If someone
had a principle of majoritarianism along those lines, I'd take it seriously, but
that wasn't his.
Powell: Mark, I want to suggest why I think that you end up in the
position I was taking on the liberal state-that it's going to be intrusive in a
way that you seem to be wanting to say it isn't and isn't committed to being.
One of the articles of peace that we signed as political liberals is that if D
is beating up on E, [then] A, B, and C will intervene. The liberal state is a
police officer, and we've got to have some method of enforcing order. Well,
D rhay beat up on E in ways other than literally doing something, for
example, by persuading her that living in a polygamous marriage is a good
thing, and I think the end result-the logic of the liberal position leads toTushnet: Well, the difficulty is that there are a number of levels to this.
It's not clear to me that it's a necessary part of the articles of peace that,
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when D is beating up on E, [then] A, B, and C can come take E's side as
opposed to taking D's side. Maybe the only necessary article of peace is that
D and E will duke it out. And maybe nobody else will come in. Maybe. I'm
not sure about that. The second level is the metaphoric extension of this
beating-up-on. If we were thinking about the problem, and asking, "Should
we include this beating-up-on provision in the articles of peace," we might
want to make it clear that we intended no metaphoric extension at all. That
is, actual physical violence is all that counts, because the metaphoric extensions
undermine-not individual autonomy. They serve individual autonomy (but
Stan and I don't think there is such a thing as that)-but they do undermine
the continuing existence of community, which is defined by the deployment
of metaphoric force. Now that I've said this, I can go back to the first.
Maybe what I've been groping for is the provision that says we will not
extend the notion of force metaphorically. That's the source of the substantive
restrictions on the scope of state authority in political liberalism.
Levinson: It does seem to me that the import of a lot of contemporary
philosophies is just to deconstruct that distinction between metaphorical and
nonmetaphorical speech, which in turn relates to the possibility of uncontested
"true" description. The instance that comes to mind is the surgeon. It
assumes a kind of behavioral or physicalist notion, that you can tell what's
happening simply from watching physical movements of people, and that,
inevitably, if you try to distinguish what a surgeon does from what a
mutilating mugger does, you've got to look at internal states of mind, or at
consent-at things like that. We wouldn't call this metaphorical. We would
regard it as bizarre to say that you could come to a conclusion about a
surgeon simply by looking at physical movements. It seems that you would
in fact be back into all of the problems of consciousness and false consciousness, and then we would get into some of the sillier tests that we've gone to
in certain areas of tort law, where there would have to be some physical
movement to justify looking at consciousness. Then people would start writing
articles asking why you need any physical movement at all, given that it's so
clear that this is a survival from an earlier, highly formalist, and unsatisfactory
philosophy. So I can see people negotiating the contract that you're talking
about, but I can also see all of this indicating, either before or after the fact,
why it's just hopeless to try to draw this sort of line.
LaRue: But that pushes in the direction of the no-state solution to this,
that is, the best way to preserve ourselves is not to have a state at all. D
beats up on E and whoever is stronger wins because the alternatives are
unattractive.
Levinson: It speaks to the inevitable inadequacy or incompleteness of
any solution. One thinks of Woody Allen: The lion and the lamb will lie
down together but the lamb won't get much sleep. On balance I think I
would prefer a state that I am quite suspicious of, in lots of ways, as a lesser
evil to no state.
Hauerwas: I don't even regard that as a real choice. I just live here and
it's God's state. I don't know how to justify it theoretically. I don't know
how to understand it. I mean that's just the way it is, and I've got to learn
how to negotiate it.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:467

Shaffer: It's like the weather.
Hauerwas: It's like the weather. It's just here. It seems to me there are
a lot of good things about it that are certainly preferable to living in South
Africa, certainly preferable to living in the Soviet Union. But I'm not going
to generate ultimate explanatory theories in order to justify it. The big
dilemma for me, in terms of the way I would put it, is this: We were pressing
on whether you can ultimately get away with the distinction between liberalism
as a normative theory about the good life, and liberalism as a political
compromise. I clearly prefer the latter, and I would like that, if we can pull
it off; but I am increasingly suspicious of whether we can pull it off. My
kind of dilemma is that it seems to me that what liberalism has tried to
produce as a political compromise is a society and a government-democratic
theories, interestingly enough, not primarily a theory about government, but
a theory about society-and that it wants to show how you could create a
society and corresponding state functions that don't need people to be virtuous
in order to have a good society. We just need them to be self-interested and
autonomous. Then you don't need to know the good. So questions like how
do you negotiate questions of abortion, etc., become very difficult, because
the assumption is that the state hasn't made any claims about what the good
is. Then one of the anomalies is Louis Hartz's suggestion 9 that liberalism
works because it continues to be able to draw upon community presuppositions and habits which it cannot justify.
Shaffer: In itself it can only negotiate issues of power-make treaties and
so on.
Hauerwas: That's right. Then one of the things that is happening is that
it is continuing to undermine the habits that it depended upon to make
liberalism work, because it's becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The wonderful thing about liberalism is that it always produces people who have too
many convictions. As a result of having too many convictions, they can't
make up their own minds and they become morally ambiguous. Now, this
can sound quite bad, but in some ways it's quite good, because it results in
a society that has a lot of trouble going to war, which should be a good
idea for us Christians, to live in a society that has a lot of trouble going to
war. Ultimately it's good to be able to live in a society with a state that
knows that it's not offering salvific solutions to people, because the church
offers the salvific solutions, not the state. So this is good. Liberalism is great.
It produces people who know that they are fundamentally self-interested, not
just descriptively, but as what they ought to be; therefore they shouldn't ask
anyone else to follow what they themselves believe in. This is great.
The problem is the results. If you just follow our political liberalism, it
looks like what you'd get is a society that is humbled. Instead you get people
who are hungry for a cause. My way of putting this is there is nothing wrong
with America for which a good war won't be capable of providing a solution,

19. L. HARTz, THE LiBERL TRADmioN iN AMERICA (1955); L. HARTz, Democracy: Image
and Reality, in DEMOCRACY TODAY: PROBLEMS AND PRosPECTs (1962)
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because American people are absolutely desperate to be able to have something
that will give their lives a sense of worth. And that scares the hell out of
me.
So, I don't know. We tried to produce a society, and tried to create a
society, that prescinds from having to say, on a society-wide basis, what we
know in common as the true and the good. And so we prescind from having
that as an explicit question for discussion. It would seem like that would be
good for a church that believes in a limited state, but in fact I'm not so sure
that's what we've got. I'm not so sure that liberalism leads to a limited state,
because what we get, as we break down societal habits of community, is the
increasing necessity for the growth of the huge bureaucratic state, of which
the primary priests are lawyers. The deep difficulty is that it does create a
deep false consciousness, because supposedly it is a limited state. So that's
my ambiguity, as a Christian relating to this. I mean it looks like political
liberalism would be my best way to negotiate a society. In fact, the results
are quite antithetical to that, particularly when you combine it with the
ideology.
Shaffer: To bring that back to something you said before, the reason
that the liberal state is not limited is because there isn't anything to limit it.
Hauerwas: That's right.
Shaffer: Or anything anymore.
Hauerwas: Except the law. And that places too great a burden on the
law. That's the reason why I have such a stake in having lawyers mess up
the system. I regard the law like Franklin Roosevelt regarded the federal
bureaucracy. Of course he wanted different agencies having responsibility for
exactly the same sets of problems, because that creates a mess. That's what
the federal government is supposed to do is to create a mess. The scariest
thing in the world would be if Washington ever became efficient. That would
be awful. So we want overlapping authorities that have to fight over the
same turf. So I find myself in a very ambiguous position in our current
situation. I don't know how to solve it at all.
Tushnet: But there are a variety of rather local decisions you make about
what you can do.
Hauerwas:That's right. I care about who's mayor of Durham. You can
say, "Well, that's a deeply irresponsible attitude, because you're not acting
as a good citizen." And I say, "Well, I don't even know what a good citizen
is in this society." I don't know what it means to be a good citizen. It's
very unclear to me. It seems to me that implicit in Sandy's book is an
assumption that we know what a good citizen would look like-or that we
should be able to come up with an account of good citizenship, within the
society in which we live, and we ought to come up with a reasonable account
of patriotism. I do not believe either of those.
Indeed, I think that, ironically, liberalism cannot give you an account of
patriotism, because a genuine account of patriotism is one that is dependent
upon an arbitrary history that is associated with a geographical area. I know
what it means to be a Texan. I do not know what it means to be an
American. Texas patriotism makes sense. American patriotism does not.
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Because American patriotism always directs you to a set of ideals that are
not geographically dependent upon a particular history and are therefore
incoherent, not genuinely patriotic. That's an argument I get from Mac20
Intyre.
So you can say I'm genuinely irresponsible. But I don't have an account
of patriotism or good citizenship. I don't think liberalism offers you one.
Ultimately I can say that my fundamental membership is in the church, not
in America. I've got a deep problem there because I haven't got much of a
church either, because of what liberalism has done to it. But what I do have
in the church is a kind of normative account. I've got enough shards of
memory around that I think I can almost maintain some kind of claim that
this is better than nothing.
I take it from what Jeff earlier commented that you are always trying
to make it work. What is this, ultimately, for you, Mark and Sandy? Do
you stand, finally, in the legal guild, trying to make it work, or do you stand
as Jews in the legal guild, using the legal guild to try to protect the Jewish
community? The way you are negotiating the situation doesn't seem to be
too much different from mine.
Tushnet: I don't think it is. I'm not sure about Sandy's position, but I
don't really, substantially, disagree with you about the issue of negotiation
of state power-negotiating lives in the context of state power. I want to say
a couple of things and then see if it would be productive to turn to the part
about patriotism and see what Sandy's response to your statement would be.
In the context of discussions of Critical Legal Studies, the claim of
irresponsibility is also made, and it existentially doesn't seem right to me. So
I want to come up with some account of what it is that I'm doing that
avoids the charge of irresponsibility. It's not clear that you [Stanley] want to
avoid that charge. It may not be of interest to you. It seems to me that your
description of what you do with your life is, in your terms, a description of
witnessing. Although it's from a different tradition, it's sort of how I feel
about what I do, too. I just do this stuff. It's out there, and people will
respond to it, and whatever. But I'm responsible for it, I'm responsible for
the stuff that I do, and whatever happens to it and so forth. That's why I
have to say the image of witnessing is powerful to me, notwithstanding its
location in another tradition.

On the issue of patriotism, let me preface this by saying that I've thought
about this a fair amount and I think that my primary identification is as a
Jew. But there is a secondary identification-I insist on using the term
"citizen of the United States," rather than "an American," because there
are other parts of America. I wonder how I would feel, in terms of my selfconcept, my self-definition, if things turned so bad here that I had to relocate

20. Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, The Lindsay Lecture, University of Kansas
(March 26, 1984).
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in another country-let me say England, just to make it easy, so I don't
have to raise language problems. I have a lot of professional skills that are
very peculiarly located in the United States. But I'm not entirely sure. Maybe
I could be a tremendous scholar, in England, of the Constitution of the
United States. I really don't know, but I have a sense that there is some
element that is United States in me. I think that's sort of the context for
talking about patriotism.
One of the issues in Sandy's loyalty oath is whether there are forms of
public action that have some historical connection to an arbitrarily defined
geographic community or geographical territory...
Hauerwas: That has a history.
Tushnet: . . .that has a history. Well, the history of the world is continuous, and the only thing that's of interest is how it has been arbitrarily
divided up in creating what are thought of as independent histories, but
aren't. The history of kingship in West Africa in the 17th-century is continuous
with the history of the United States in the 20th in some rather obvious ways
that are excluded from consciousness by the arbitrary definition. So the claim
about loyalty oaths is that we can remind ourselves of continuities of history,
within a geographic territory, by overcoming some of our arbitrary exclusions.
How about that?
Levinson: There are several different things. One is that I think the
relationship between geography and community is getting more and more
tenuous. One thing that I don't talk about in this book at all, but have
written about elsewhere, 2' is theories of representation. In the initial notion
of representation, we assumed that communities were geographically located,
so that representation by the single-member district was sensible. I think that
it is increasingly problematic, which is one of the reasons there is increasing
interest in notions of proportional representation. Bruce Ackerman22 has
written some interesting stuff on this. It seems to me that what is key about
the United States, even though it is located geographically, is that it is
ideologically defined in very important ways; it may be in that sense more
indicative of the modem world.
That's connected to witnessing. Part of the question is whether one can
witness to constitutional faith. Martin Luther King engaged in Christian
witness, but he also very explicitly engaged in American witness, calling upon
American traditions. Michael Walzer2 has written extensively in his recent
work about the notion of prophecy, and critique from within. Since Walzer
is really a political sociologist, or cultural anthropologist, this can be applied
inside: You don't have to talk about Jonah; you can talk about Frederick
Douglass. The question is whether we believe there exists a body of materials
that is American or of the United States-though part of the difficulty is to

21. Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the Brooding Omnipresence of ProportionalRepresentation: Why It Won't Go Away, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257 (1985).
22. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAgv. L. REv. 713 (1985).
23. M. WvA=ZR, INTERPRETATION A
SocIAL CRmcisu (1987).
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have to talk about those materials that perceive the United States as a legal
entity-whether there is a body of materials that do constitute us in some
way, and that provide a basis for people bearing witness.
These materials can be speeches but they can also be events. I think
again what Bruce Ackerman has done with the Philadelphia Convention is
very interesting. 24 If you view Philadelphia as separate in its meaning from
the written work that was produced there, what are the implications? If that
event doesn't in some ways constitute us as members of the United States
community, I really don't know what would. Maybe it doesn't. That is an
acceptable empirical answer-that this is all a will-o'-the-wisp. But there are
certainly people who believe that we are constituted by our stories. I assume
all cultures are story telling. Certainly we can all reel off standard American
stories that are supposed to be exemplary for our lives. People are supposed
to emulate them. Values are there to be emulated.
There is a really delicious paradox in talking about these things at
Washington and Lee. The father of our country and a man who may or
may not be a traitor. What do you do with that? First of all, do we as
individuals around this table believe that any of this material really speaks
to us, calls upon us, constitutes us in certain ways? A separate questionthough it's undoubtedly linked-is, do we believe that we as a society should
do what we can to make sure that this body of materials is being transmitted
to the next generation? And that's where the question of civic education
comes up. One of the things I've always liked, from outside, about the
Protestant tradition is the constant adult education that goes on, at least
among the Baptists I grew up with. The Wednesday meetings and the two
meetings on Sunday and quite literally God knows how much else of this.
One fantasy of mine has been a kind of adult civic education. That would
be a sign of our taking this stuff seriously, after all the talk. That's one
reason I liked the Bork hearings. I think that at their best they turned into
that sort of thing.
LaRue: The Watergate hearings [also]?
Levinson: You mention Watergate and that for me triggers a free
association of Barbara Jordan and what we do with her comment about faith
in the Constitution. Are we embarrassed by it? Do we identify with it? Do
we say that it's the high point? Do we say this is just ridiculous? Do we
simply explain that she is a very cagey politician who's manipulating rhetoric
that she didn't believe a word of, but that she knew people out there would
respond to, that we're too sophisticated to respond to?
Hauerwas: We haven't gotten to Protestant-Catholic interpretation in
that. We really want to do that. I think it's very important. I'm really sorry
you hit on David Tracy25 to read because I think his position is finally

24. Ackerman, The StorrsLectures: Discoveringthe Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
25. D. TRAcY, THE ANALooIcAL IMAGINATION: C.iusriAN THEOLOGY AND THE CULTuRE OF
PLURALSM (1981); R. GRANT & D. TRAcy, A SHORT HIsToRY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
BoE (1984).
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wrongheaded. My kind of line is this: If you want to know what happened
to Protestant liberal theology, it has died and is in the souls of living Catholic
theologians-and Tracy, despite some counter aspects in his work, is squarely
in the liberal tradition. For example, this is exemplified by his use of the
distinction between event and interpretation.
I don't believe in Philadelphia. There is a certain sense in which I want
to say yes to it. It may make sense to say that something happened at
Philadelphia that is not equivalent to the written document, the Constitution,
in a way I do not believe it makes sense to say that something happened
when Moses led the Children of Israel out of Egypt, in a way that that event
makes sense separate from the Book of Exodus. I don't believe that Moses
knew, or the people of Israel knew, that they were engaged in an exodus.
Through the creation of the people of Israel we now know that that was an
exodus, but you can't have the Exodus without the creation of the people of
Israel, who give us the Book of Exodus. So in a certain sense we don't have
Philadelphia without the Constitution-without the people of America who
then maintained the interpretive categories that are necessary for fitting that
within an ongoing narrative.
Levinson: We also don't have the Constitution without Philadelphia. The
two are linked but separable. They carry separate messages.
Hauerwas: That's true. Of course that's the reason why I'm not a
Protestant liberal. I really believe that Moses had to lead the Children of
Israel out of Egypt. I'm one of the few Christian theologians left who believe
that if we found documents clearly showing that Jesus was dragged kicking
and screaming to the Cross saying-"I don't want to go, I don't want to
go, I just wanted to preach a religion of love and there's been a deep
misunderstanding. Is this really necessary? Can't we sit down and come to
some understanding on this?"-if we really came up with evidence of that,
we ought to give it up. It's just bullshit. You know, it's not true. So I really
want to think that these things have to happen in some serious way that is
not in deep discontinuity with our reports of them. But I think that the
Children of Israel didn't know that they were in an exodus. I think, as a
matter of fact, that if the Exodus didn't happen in some ways closely
resembling what was going on, then, as a matter of fact, the God we worship
isn't true. So we're making strong historical claims about continuity between
the people that were created and what they thought was happening in the
events of their creation.
A word about patriotism in that regard: I regard the development of the
modern nation-state as a fiction. It is a fiction, an attempt to create something
that is determined, primarily in the interest of peace. It was the result of
trying to find a way to stop Protestants and Catholics from killing themselves
in the religious wars developed since the Reformation. It was Kant's great
vision to try to create the fiction of a nation, that is a consensual community,
that is possible between autonomous individuals exercising their rationality,
to come to contracts between one another, to create republican governments.
Levinson: I think you are confusing European liberalism with the particular narrative story of this country. I think that the Preamble to the
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Constitution has almost nothing to do with Kant, and almost nothing to do
with this peace-treaty notion of the liberal state. I think the "more perfect
Union," the "establishment of justice," comes out of communitarian Calvinism. It comes out of secular utopianism. It comes out of a number ofthings. I think that the Preamble would be very, very different if it were
peace-treaty liberalism.
Hauerwas: I think that's right.
Levinson: King and others draw on the American story. I think it's also
informative that constitutional lawyers either have never known what to do
with the Preamble, or simply and utterly have ruled it out as a source. We
are spending an ungodly amount of time trying to figure out what the Ninth
Amendment could possibly mean. Nobody ever suggests, "Well, just look
upstairs, and say that what gives this whole thing point is a more perfect
Union, and establishing justice." Therefore the Supreme Court can say, "Go
establish justice." People continue to ignore that connection, but I think, in
terms of the story, in terms of what explains what they were doing in
Philadelphia, and the strength of that American rhetoric, it has meant in
terms of the values expressed in the preamble that they are, "for better or
worse," part of the essential narrative. And there are times when I think it
is distinctly for the worse that it's not been merely peace-treaty liberalism,
but it's always been a notion that we have an aim quite separate from peace.
Hauerwas: That's in some tension with Mark's political liberalism. I
think you're right, in terms of the historical background behind the Preamble,
but my statement on that would say it doesn't make a bit of difference. In
fact, political liberalism out of Kant has become the way that we interpret
what the "more perfect Union" is going to look like. That's partly because
what the modern nation-state has been about is the attempt to increase
geographic units in the interests of peace, so we don't get wars between
Indiana and Ohio over the headwaters of the Kankakee. This was a great
achievement to be able to do that. But it's an illusory achievement because
the very ideologies necessary to produce those unions can't give an account
of why those geographic units aren't arbitrary.
Germany and France are liberal societies, or at least quasi-liberal societies,
that don't want to face up to the arbitrariness of their geographic units.
That's one of the things that Rawls 26 can't account for in his theory of
justice. It's just an anomaly about what geographic unit is going to undertake
the principles of justice. You can't come up with an account of what
geographic units are going to be doing that kind of bargaining. That's one
of the illusions of liberalism, that it is not a limited doctrine in that way,
and that's the reason why it has to be inherently imperialistic, because it has
to show that everyone will finally accept the two principles of justice.
Levinson: Walzer, 27 though, tries to resolve that.

26. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE (1971). See G. GRANT, ENGUSH-SPEAKING
(1985) (developing this point in a critique of Rawls).
27. M. WAZER, supra note 23.
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Hauerwas: He doesn't do it very well.
Levinson: But at least he recognizes it and says that liberalism is our
constitutive tradition.
Hauerwas: That's my point about patriotism. It's always going to be an
ideal that says that patriotism is not in principle geographically limited. Except
Walzer turns it into a confessional faith. In principle it should not be, a la
Kant, a confessional faith. That's the reason why I say that it was the peace
treaty that was necessary. Liberalism, as the Enlightenment ideology, to
establish peace in Europe, became the ideology that justified Western imperialism. I think that was intrinsic in the logic of it. Walzer is a wonderful
example of someone who wants to pull back from those ideological pretensions, and just say, "Whoops, our faith is within these geographic units."
It's very hard to keep it that way. That's the reason why liberal patriotism
always is imperialistic, because it wants to say that everyone should look this
way, because it doesn't want to believe that its geographic units are arbitrary.
Texans know that our geographic unit is arbitrary, because our history is
arbitrary.
Shaffer: Is that why the early civic religion liked to claim that America
was God's new Israel? To give it geographical identification?
Hauerwas: Sure, and then to give it a sense of mission for the whole
world.
Shaffer: So patriotism is about land.
Hauerwas: A land and a mission.
Richardson: Can your Texan patriotism have a strong critical element in
it? If you become aware of serious social injustice, gross suffering of people,
would you want to do something about that? And if so, how? Which channels
would you use?
Hauerwas: If they are our people; not if they are Mexicans. One of the
interesting things about Texas is that many of the early Texans were Mexicans.
And people forget that Seguine was at the Alamo, on the right side. Matter
of fact, he got out. He was one of the few people who got out. He then
later became mayor of San Antonio. Then, when we decided that Mexicans
shouldn't be mayors of San Antonio, we ran him out of Texas. This is all
true. It can contain some critical elements. Yes, it can. And has. I think
partly because it knows that it's limited. My view is that it is ultimately an
insufficient, limited account.
I wrote an essay once called "On Being a Christian and a Texan, a
Theological Entertaimnent,"' ' in which I tried to suggest that I wouldn't ever
have known what it meant to be a Christian unless I had been marked by
being a Texan, because Texans know that they are a limited community, that
we just got stuck with being Texans. We're awfully glad that we were, but,
ultimately, we find that we need another community, to find our limits.
That's the way you realize that being a Christian is a little like being marked

28. Hauerwas, A Tale of Two Stories: On Being a Christian and a Texan: A Theological
Entertainment, 34 PERms J. 1 (1981).
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as being a Texan. Being a Texan gives you a better critical hold on your
Christian convictions. I always remember that when I was a kid, growing
up, I was driving through Greenville, Texas, on my way to Mississippi, where
my mother was from. You drove under a sign on old U.S. 40, if you went
into Greenville, that said, "Greenville, Texas, the blackest land, the whitest
people." That's what we grew up with. That's the way Texans deal with sin.
We turn it into banners and claim it as righteousness. Obviously it's not a
very good critical principle. But I think it's better than the United States of
America, in terms of its liberal pretensions.
Richardson: But how do you go about correcting it, when you want to
correct it-as a Texan, or as a Christian?
Hauerwas: As a Christian. You'd do it-you know, the way porcupines
make love-very carefully. You take things on one at a time. You don't have
big theories for it. You take down that sign.
Shaffer: Again, it's like the weather.
Hauerwas: Like the weather, yes. But in that way it's embarrassing for
me. I think one of the things one has to say is that liberalism has done a
hell of a lot better than Christians about locating injustice, and doing
something about it. I'm quite willing to say that. Then you get the other
side of that. The very grounds on which liberalism has located the injustice,
and done something about it, ironically, mean that we have to be coercive
against the Mormons. I think we should allow them to have more than one
wife.

White: May I use that as an opportunity to return to Jeff Powell's point
about Mormon polygamy, going back especially to the 19th-century case?
There is a crucial problem that arises with the criterion of subordination that
you use. If that's examined in historical context, the Mormon argument,
offered by Mormon men and women, would have been that monogamy was
more oppressive than polygamy. Ironically, some contemporary feminists,
working with Mormon materials, are now arguing that there is a real,
legitimate case here. Mormon polygamous wives ran households when their
husbands were either away on missions or involved in other activities. They
essentially ran the business. In fact, there are data to suggest that in Utah
as a territory, throughout that period, women were disproportionately represented in law, medicine, and other professions. In the context of the
Victorian era, with the rise of industrialization and the pushing of women
back into the household, which monogamy reinforced, polygamous wives had
more options than monogamous wives.
The Mormons bought into the sexual stereotype that we talk about now
as characteristic of the Victorian era. They saw men as sexually overactive,
and women as uninterested in sex. There is even the argument that, having
this conception of sexuality, Mormon women were freed from the sexual
demands that monogamy imposed, in a way that other women within the
society weren't. Mormon women identified themselves as very adamant feminists. There's a bit of irony here, too, in the sense that they had official
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support from Mormon leaders, including Brigham Young, endorsing the
feminist movement. I don't want to overstate his sympathies. Young had
some other good reasons to argue for women having the right to vote. It
would double the Mormon vote. He had, as well, good reasons to argue for
women having choices that they were losing, or never had, within the
American experience, because they could then choose polygamy, if the free
choice issue became a crucial one. So there was a sort of patriarchal Mormon
self-interest in the endorsement of feminism at that point.
But you can show that there were larger gatherings among Mormon
women in support of feminism than other places in the country. Polygamy
posed a problem for non-Mormon feminists, but Mormon feminists saw that
as a real misreading of their situation. The ideology produced during the
period by Mormons argued that women were freer in Utah than they were
in the society at large. If the subordination principle is the issue, then you've
got to determine what kind of criteria to use: Is this an empirical question?
If it's an empirical question, and the Mormons are correct, then you might
have to condemn monogamy rather than polygamy.
Powell: The late 19th-century liberal state's explanation of why it's going
to tromp the religious community's views was not really subordination, but,
rather, the view that these folks were sexually immoral. The state was
concerned about the destruction of families.
White: No, I think that was wrong, too, as to why they acted.
Powell: Okay. But I was trying to come up with what a legitimate 20thcentury liberal ought to say.
White: If you said that as a late 20th-century liberal, what do you do
with the 19th-century case?
Powell: Everything you say reinforces a point I was trying to make in
response to Mark, which is that liberalism very definitely has an account of
the good, which it will enforce against communities that have contrary
accounts. Suppose, in the 19th-century case, they had made the 20th-century
subordination argument. And the Mormon feminists responded, as you have
said, with empirical data and so on. I think it is perfectly rational and
consistent, in the liberal state, to say, "Too bad. We don't care. That's your
account; our account is the one that's going to be enforced." I can agree
with everything you say, and say that the liberal state will not recognize it,
because it has its own account of the good that must triumph. In the end it
will use coercion to enforce that-stick it down other people's throats.
White: Well, that certainly is what happened, but I don't think it
happened for those reasons. That is, I don't think polygamy was the issue
at all. The Mormon denial of the legitimacy of the nation-state is what was
really crucial. This empire being set up out West claimed economic autonomy,
and political autonomy, and so on. Polygamy became the issue by which you
could mobilize New England puritanical types against the Mormons.
Powell: But that's once again saying that the liberal state is not going to
tolerate any religious community's self-definition, if that self-definition contradicts the liberal state's major commitments and views.
White: You're making that as an observation about the liberal state.
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Powell: Oh, yeah.
White: I may have misread you. I thought you were defending it, in
response to one of Stanley's points. Defending it in the sense that you'd
identified here, with the subordination of women as a meaningful criterion
for the state's intervention.
Powell: I'm defending it in the sense of Mark's attempt to say that you
can keep a liberal account that is not going to force things down people's
throats. I think the liberal state is going to force its account of the good on
other people.
Millon: I think related to that is the fact that liberalism as a set of
principles pays lip service to an idea of toleration, as one of the central ideas,
but it has, within this set of principles that constitute liberalism, contrary
principles that allow intolerance in certain situations to be legitimate. I think
that's also the point you are making. Not that any particular doctrinal
argument, like the one he posited, is a good one or not. Simply that, within
liberalism, these arguments are possible, and we have to keep in mind that
liberalism-as we talk about this straw person or this ideal-includes all these
contrary features.
White: You chose the Mormon case, though, to bring up initially, because
of some of the complexities with that. Jonestown is a little bit easier to deal
with. You could deal with Brigham Young, and blood atonement, and all of
these things, if you could have documented them, and have a different kind
of case, I think, from the one you'd have in this instance.
Beckley: Jonestown is a tougher case for Stanley.
Hauerwas: Yeah.
Beckley: Precisely because people were getting killed.
Hauerwas: Sure. Right. It is a tough case. I think that the liberal state
did not fail in Jonestown; I believe the church failed. Those people were
martyrs to liberalism. What I mean by that is that they were the kinds of
people that liberalism inherently wants to create-basically rootless people in
California who are desperate for a sense of community. Jones gave it to
them. Jones created a fascist community for them that gave them something
worth dying for. Trained them for it. There was a lot of admirable stuff
that was going on there. They cared for one another. They were liberal
martyrs-I would rather say victims-because they had not been schooled
sufficiently by the church to give them a critical ability to stand against that
kind of community when it offered salvation. They were being given a false
salvation. One of the interesting questions about descriptive claims is those
who killed themselves said they were martyred; we, that is, we liberals want
to call it suicide. My own view is that we are right in imposing our description,
suicide, as Christians. But they were right to call it revolutionary suicide. Of
course the way the liberal press wants to do it is to say isn't it terrible that
Jones is able to manipulate these poor ignorant people into doing this terrible
thing, because, as a matter of fact, they should have been good liberals; they
should have understood that there is nothing worth dying for in this world.
And of course, as a Christian, I want to say you ought to be ready to be
martyred. There's a lot worth dying for, and therefore we ought to honor
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their assumption that they were revolutionary martyrs, the difficulty being
that the god that they allowed themselves to be martyred to was a false god.
Therefore their deaths are terrible deaths.
White: Now where do you go with your claim then that we are justified
in calling that suicide?
Hauerwas: We're only justified in calling it suicide from within the
Christian community, because we are pretty clear about what suicide means.
Suicide is when you allow your life to be taken from you, or you do it by
your own hand, in an unjust manner. What an unjust manner means is that
you rob God of God's proper power over your life.
White: What do you do with Jonestown? Is it just a tragedy?
Hauerwas: Yeah.
White: And that's the only thing that can be done? Or can you intervene?
Hauerwas: I don't think liberal society can intervene.
White: I think it can. Oh, sure. If it can intervene in polygamy it can
surely intervene here.
Hauerwas: On what grounds would it intervene?
Levinson: A liberal society probably wouldn't use the language of "false
consciousness;" it would, however, use the language of "brainwashing." But
intervention there would take place. I think part of the problem with the
implications of liberalism is that there are very, very few libertarians of the
kind you are using as typical of liberal, for better or worse.
Hauerwas: That's right.
Levinson: You can find lots of people who view themselves as good
liberals who will intervene where the Hare Krishnas are concerned.
Powell: Take your own statement, Stan, that a good liberal knows that
there is nothing worth dying for. Okay, that means that we know that those
people are not making rational choices when they go follow this guy, and
that means that they are not acting autonomously, and that means that the
liberal state-which has an admirable, liberal, moral obligation to enhance
people's autonomy-has to step in.
Hauerwas: That is the way the logic of the argument would work. And
that's going to be really very coercive.
Tushnet: It occurred to me, when you, Stan, were talking about Jonestown and its relation to liberalism, that you want to say that Jonestown was
the product of the success of liberalism in creating people like that, but also
the product of the failure of liberalism, in refusing to intervene when, in
other situations, liberals have not quarreled about whether intervention is
appropriate.
Beckley: Who's a liberal? Are the authors of the Catholic bishops' letters
30
liberals?29 William Galston?
Hauerwas: I assume we are all liberals. I don't believe anybody who is
working within the American context can avoid the habits of liberalism. I'm
trying to slowly think my way out of it.
29. See supra notes 8-9.
30. W. GAStsON, JUSTICE AND
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Beckley: But sometimes you talk as though the only liberals are those
who have desires, or self-interests, without any conception of the good; and
sometimes you talk as though liberals had conceptions of the good. It seems
to me that liberals have all different kinds of conceptions of the good. Rawls
is different from Nozick, 3' and both of them have conceptions of what is
good, and the Catholic bishops are different from that, and so on and so
forth.
Hauerwas: Well, as a political theory, liberalism at least claims that.
Someone like Rawls, if you take him as a paradigmatic liberal theorist, wants
to say that we can have a social agreement in a way that prescinds from any
agreed upon material goods of what we want as a society.
Beckley: He sometimes says that, but that's not the way he makes his
moves. He does have a commitment to equality and freedom. Those are
goods that he wants to preserve.
Hauerwas: Which he has a lot of trouble giving any substance to, exactly
because he prescinds from any kind of narrative construal necessary to give
them substance. Sandy has a commitment to egalitarianism, too, but Sandy's
commitment to egalitarianism is necessary as one of the preconditions for
continuing the discussion about how to interpret the Constitution. Sandy's
egalitarianism is kind of along the lines of A. D. Lindsay's old argument,3 2
the one that shows that at least the beginnings of democracy come out of
the Puritan congregation, insofar as what is necessary for maintaining the
modern democratic state-A. D. Lindsay's modem democratic state. Egalitarianism isn't an end in itself. It's the precondition for maintaining the
discussion, for the community's discovery of what the goods are. I'm very
sympathetic with that point of view.
I know that liberalism comes in many shapes and sizes. I tend to try to
make it live up to its most consistent expression, because I agree that most
liberals aren't consistent. I mean you are quite right, Sandy. We know they
want to educate five-year-olds with something. I think it's quite unclear that
they know what they're doing when they do that. But, nonetheless, I think
that we are increasingly becoming a consistent liberal society, and I try to
figure out what the implication of that is going to be. I think Rawls is a
perfect exemplification of that. Even the incoherences within Rawls's account
help us find this. The deepest incoherence in liberalism is the failure to
recognize that it is a tradition, and therefore has a contingent starting point
within the Enlightenment. The false consciousness created by the denial that
liberalism is a tradition, I think, accounts for why liberal societies are so
violent. The irony is that liberalism, in the name of being an antistate
position, has given us the most powerful bureaucratic state that the world
has ever seen.
Tushnet: Well, not quite.

31. J. RAwLs, supra note 26; R. Nozim, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
32. A. D. LINDSAY, TI MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE (1962).
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Hauerwas: The Soviet Union. I regard Marxism as a form of liberalism.
My sense of this, of course, is a very global claim, but I think that the two
greatest Christian heresies we have ever seen are now regnant in the world;
one is called the U.S.S.R. and the other is called the U.S.A. And they are
both fighting over who's going to determine the meaning of human history,
in terms of who's going to finally find the way to unleash the new creation
of the autonomous human being. These are regnant things that are at war.
And they are liberal states.
Tushnet: I have a series of thoughts that are connected with Harlan's
concern that liberalism is being used badly in this discussion, and also to
Stanley's juxtaposition of Exodus and Philadelphia. It seems to me that what
you've said so far doesn't take account of the ongoing, always ongoing,
reworking of the narratives that constitute the tradition.
As I understand it, the current political theory is precisely to recapture
the understanding of liberalism as a tradition that emerged in response to a
particular set of problems, and when these people tell the story about
liberalism in that way, they are recreating, transforming the tradition within
which they are working, not simply recapturing something that existed. When
you say you want to think about the most consistent working out of liberal
presuppositions, and that turns out to be different from what people who
identify themselves as liberals today say that they are contemplating, one
possibility is that you are working out the implications of a set of presuppositions of a tradition, not a tradition to which they don't adhere, but
which they are transforming.
Hauerwas:Well, then you just have to say, "Give me a different account,
and let's see how you justify that kind of account." One thing we haven't
mentioned: We've been talking about liberalism primarily as a moral and
political theory, but of course it's an economic theory. I think that that's
increasingly becoming worked out, consistently, in terms that we are beginning
to see. More and more of our lives are open to the market. I regard the
Baby M case33 as a nice working out of the moral implications of capitalism.
The fact that people are shocked by it is odd. Soon we'll see that there really
isn't any reason to have laws against prostitution. There really isn't any
reason to have laws against suicide. There are no economic grounds for such
laws. There is not any reason, if someone wants to insure their family's
future by saying, "Yes, I'll sell all five of my major organ systems, even
though I'm thirty-five." There's no reason to prevent that.
Tushnet: Wouldn't the alternative say that your perception of the incredible ambivalence about Baby M as odd-doesn't that perception indicate that
you haven't described where the liberal tradition is now? Milton Friedman
regards the ambivalence as odd, but the phenomenon in the liberal society is
of a great deal of ambivalence about this-resistance to the extension of
market norms. Sure it has gotten quite far, but there's some resistance to
those-

33. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1987).
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Hauerwas: On what grounds is the resistance?
Tushnet: Well, I don't know.
Hauernvas: That's what's interesting. On what possible grounds is the
resistance?
Beckley: That's a question that ought to make any liberal nervous. But
there are some possible grounds.
Hauenvas: Well, give them to me.
Levinson: Well, you're smuggling in a lot of foundationalism here. You're
askingTushnet: But it's pre-Enlightenment foundationalism.
Levinson: Well, whatever it is. Sometimes you appear to be a nonfoundationalist, or an anti foundationalist, but you want liberals to come up
with the rock-bottom foundation, and if they don'tHauerwas: That's no reason.
Tushnet: It's their tradition. It is their tradition that they have to provide
the reasons, and Stan's saying you can't operate within that tradition without
doing what he's asking.
Millon: There are a couple of reasons within the tradition. One would
be that the mother of Baby M was under duress when she made the
agreement-no freedom of contract. Another would be that there is a certain
category of things to which market concepts don't apply-individual physical
autonomy or-I don't know how you define it. There are means within
liberalism that you can use.
Hauerwas: Of course the former one would mean that we have to be
more careful about how we draw up the contracts, and under what conditions
they are drawn up, but there's nothing inherently wrong with them. So that
doesn't speak against surrogate parenting at all. It just says that you have
to be better at it. The second one-then you'd have to show if, empirically,
people really are doing that. I mean: Are they subjecting their bodies to
wrong use? We allow people to sell their blood.
Millon: But my point is that, within this set of principles we call liberalism,
there is room for this kind of dialogue. There is nothing necessary about
liberalism, as a core of principles, that dictates any of these results.
Beckley: And there's room for the notion that there is a public good
that would be threatened if you allow certain kinds of sales such as blood
transfusions. I think a liberal can argue against the public sale of blood on
those kinds of grounds.
Millon: The judge would just say it's against public policy and that
would be it.
Hauerwas: But then I think that what you are going to get into is the
problem of majoritarianism and how you establish what those public goods
are. It's just what the majority agrees upon.
Beckley: But there could be evidence here. We can see that over the long
run that kind of market will destroy the supply of blood and what that
would do to the community. If you have a notion of people being highly
interdependent... There are so many forms of liberalism. That is all I want
to say. You could include those who determine the public good on majori-
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tarian grounds and the Catholic bishops as well, or, say, John Ryan, who
participates in the American democratic experiment, and so on. They are just
quite different from Robert Nozick.
Hauerwas: Well, I agree. The Catholic bishops are probably personally
liberals, but in terms of Catholic theology and political theory they certainly
are not liberal-within their tradition and how it is worked out. And I think
that's the reason why they have so much trouble finding a voice. I do think
that the convoluted rhetoric of rights in the economic pastoral letter is partly
convoluted because it's so hard to make rights language work within Catholic
economic thought.
Shaffer: Sandy suggested four possible places to begin this afternoon.
They are civic education, patriotism, Abraham Lincoln, and Sandy's Protestant-Catholic analytical categories 4 I can't fit the fourth into the other
three, but you could cover the other three with Abraham Lincoln, I think.
It strikes me as an intriguing place to begin.
Levinson: One of the things I have realized in reading the manuscript of
Constitutional Faith for copy editing is that Abraham Lincoln plays a key
role throughout the whole manuscript, and that Lincoln is one of the two or
three most important single figures in the American narrative. One question
that I would like to throw out is what one does with Lincoln. That question
in turn can take a number of forms. One is very personal. What do you
personally do with Lincoln? Does the Lincoln Memorial resonate with you?
Do you view Lincoln as a key figure in a narrative that is important to you,
etc.? If there is such a thing as civil religion, then presumably Lincoln is a
character in it, and one would assume that he would resonate in a way that
James K. Polk doesn't.
Other questions can be less personal and a little bit more distant: How
should Lincoln be taught? How did he err? Or should Lincoln be taught to
the young as part of civic education? Why is he on the five-dollar bill? Why
do you have the Memorial? What makes him such an important figure? Is
that something the young in our society should know, so that when E.B.
Hirsch gives the next round of cultural literacy tests they would know

34. See Constitutional Faith, supra note 2. In ConstitutionalFaith "'Protestantism' ...
refers either (1) to an emphasis on the exclusivity of written Scripture or text as the basis of
doctrine, or (2) to the legitimacy of individual (or at least relatively non-hierarchical communitarian) interpretation as against the claims of a specific, hierarchically organized, institution.

'Catholicism' ... refers either (1) to the legitimacy of unwritten tradition in addition to Scripture,
or (2) to the authority of a particular institution, hierarchically organized, to give binding
interpretations of disputed aspects of relevant materials."
Regarding the Constitution: "As to source of doctrine, the protestarit position is that it is
the constitutional text alone, while the catholic position is that the source of doctrine is the text
of the Constitution plus unwritten tradition. As to the ultimate authority to interpret the source
of doctrine, the protestant position is based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation, while the catholic position is that the Supreme Court is
the dispenser of ultimate interpretation."
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something about Lincoln-more than that he was a president at some time.
And then if the young should know something about Lincoln, what is it they
should know? Should he be taught as a great constitutionalist, and indeed as
a preserver of the Constitution, or should he be taught as Father Abraham
in a quite different sense of smashing the idols, and knowing when to let the
1787 constitution go and engage in quite ruthless behavior to organize a new
covenant and a new understanding?
Among the frightening possibilities is what he himself suggested in a well
known speech in 1838 about lions and eagles, and this is what he said: Let
respect for law be the political religion of our nation. Part of what was going
on was hi trying to come to terms with the Founders who did not have
respect for law, and he was very well aware that to emulate the Founders
could be to disrespect law and to engage in a refounding. One of the things
that makes Lincoln of such interest to the Straussians, among other communities of students, is that he has claimed to be a genuine founder himself,
by engaging in transgression. So: Do we build a monument to him as a
transgressor carrying the message that we too can transgress, so that there is
a line from Lincoln to Martin Luther King? You could have much less
attractive bloodlines than from Lincoln to Martin Luther King. Or do we
teach him as a man who preached reverence for the law? And that's what
the young should know, that's the part of Lincoln they should emulate?
LaRue: I can talk about that because I do teach Lincoln in constitutional
law. I'm one of the few people in constitutional law who teaches the Dred
Scott 5 case. I spend several days on it. I teach Taney's majority opinion,
Curtis's dissent, and what I call Lincoln's dissent, that is, his speech at
Springfield that kicks off the Lincoln-Douglas debates. I think that his speech
at Springfield is the most important opinion in constitutional law, which is
why I teach it. Taney and Curtis debated the question of the historical
understanding of citizenship and all of those sorts of things, and Lincoln in
that speech at Springfield, and in the rest of the Lincoln-Douglas debates,
trumped the Constitution with the Declaration. That was the move. He said
the Constitution is the document of 1776. When he said "four score and
seven years ago" he was dating from the Declaration, and that was not a
clich6 as it is today, to date the country from the Declaration. It was a
contested question of what is the founding document of the country, what
is the date.
Now, Lincoln says-he didn't put it this way, but from the point of
view of a constitutional lawyer you can say-the Constitution itself is a set
of compromises. Anybody that says anything about the Constitution and its
drafting and its history knows that. So what's fundamental? Is it slavery
that's fundamental, and we've made a compromise with freedom, or is it
equality that's fundamental, and we've made a necessary pragmatic compromise with slavery? What's fundamental? His position was that it was the
Declaration that was the trump.

35. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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So at Gettysburg, when he declares the nation to be dedicated to the
proposition that all are created equal, he is repeating then, in the context of
the war, the proposition that he had advanced throughout the LincolnDouglas debates, and since that speech at Springfield. And I think he's right.
That is to say that if you are to explain the positive law of constitutional
law you cannot do so on the grounds that the document of 1787 with its
amendments, including the Civil War amendments, is the Constitution. You
can't explain Brown v. Board6 on that ground. You can't explain Baker v.
Carr17 You can't explain Roe v. Wade.3 8 You cannot explain what defeated
Bork, because if you think the document of 1787, with its amendments of
1789 and 1867, is the Constitution, Bork is right; but Bork is wrong, and
Lincoln is right.
Hauerwas: Do you take that to be a Protestant or a Catholic interpretation?
LaRue: Actually I think it's a Talmudic one. I think when Sandy states
his position at the end of that section of his book, combining the Protestant
and Catholic interpretation, and said this combination is the position I rest
on, he in fact asserts the Talmudic position.
Levinson: That's clearly correct. Protestant-Catholic is used for two
reasons, one of which is simply that I assume that my audience will be much,
much more familiar with the gross categories Protestantism and Catholicism
than with any other gross categories one would use. The second answer is
very, very appropriate to Stanley's point this morning, and that is that, as a
Jew raised in Western North Carolina, I know more about Christianity in
some ways than I do about Judaism, because my friends included a Baptist,
a Methodist, a Presbyterian, a Catholic, and an Episcopalian, and we would
argue endlessly. So, unlike most of my own students today, I have some
sense of the difference between a Baptist and a Presbyterian. I do not have
a nuanced sense. I must confess to you and to others that I've never really
understood what Methodists are about.
And it is in fact that only over the last five or six years that I have
begun studying in any serious sense Jewish materials. What I find attractive
in what I call the Protestant argument is also in the dominant Jewish tradition:
only minimal institutional authority to speak of, plus multiple sources for
doctrine.
Hauerwas: Yes, multiple sources but yet still a continuation of a community of testing, which always is going to say that the interpretation must
do justice to at least some classical document, the Torah.
Levinson: Yes, but there are no criteria at all of what counts as doing
justice, and remarkable things have been done in the name of fidelity.
Hauerwas: But why should they continue to assume that the Torah has
overriding status?

36. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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LaRue: Because of its continuous revelation.
Levinson: Let me read one other paragraph that's been added to the text
since the version you got because it's clearly relevant: "One recent writer has
described rabbinic authority as including the creative ability to 'reshape the
Torah, to determine its official meaning, and to set aside even explicit rules
as the interpreters see fit.' " Interestingly enough, in light of our earlier
discussion of Lincoln and other founders, what legitimizes rabbinic creativity
seems to be a matter more of character than of following any specific rules
of interpretation. If a creative act "is carried out by one whose intention is
to establish his own systemic primacy over that even of the Torah," the act
is illegitimate. "If, however, the action is motivated by a real concern for
the preservation of the primacy of the Torah itself within the halachic system,
and if the situation is such that this preservation can be accomplished best
through the abrogation of one of its dictates, the action is legal. In other
words, the assurance that rabbinic legislation abrogating the Torah is secondary, not primary, is dependent upon the personal virtues required of the
'39
authorities of the system."
I am trying explicitly to tie this with Lincoln. There are no formal
arguments that can say Lincoln was an interpreter rather than an inventor.
Ultimately you have to decide what you think of his character, what you
think of the values to which he was committed. But abstract rules of
interpretation are almost no help in coming to terms with Lincoln, or coming
to terms with the great rabbis, or presumably great religious leaders in other
traditions, and they all become essentially contested figures for that reason.
I guess part of what I am curious about is whether Lincoln is essentially
contested, or whether people don't think of him much one way or the other,
that he is treated as merely the guy on the five-dollar bill.
Hauerwas:In terms of your original questions, apart from the interpretive
thing, when I go back to Washington, D.C., I go to two places. I always go
to the Lincoln Memorial and I go to the Vietnam Memorial. I regard the
Vietnam Memorial as our great piece of national sculpture, and I go to the
Lincoln Memorial to read the Second Inaugural. And I read the Second
Inaugural as a Southerner, because I think that it articulates well the South's
tragic sense of the war. I always pray that somehow that might become part
of our national consciousness, which it is not. The way that Lincoln is read
is not in light of the Second Inaugural, nor even in the options that you lay
out in the book in terms of overriding habeas corpus, or what Lash [LaRue]
has suggested in terms of Lincoln's making the Declaration of Independence
the primary text. Lincoln is read primarily within the American context as a
winner, because the story that is told about Lincoln is this grim determination
to win the war. He did win the war, and that's what we believe Americans
are about-winning through determination and power on the side of righteousness and good.

39. S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArm 153 (1988).
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As a result, we lose entirely the sensitivity that Lincoln himself had about
the tragic character of the war, and why it was a genuine struggle, and why
he knew that the decisions he was having to make at that time were matters
of judgment which were creating something new, that was absolutely necessary
in order to preserve the Union. So I value Lincoln deeply, but I value Lincoln
primarily because I think he was an extraordinary person. I think he was
one of America's great theologians, but he has been misread so deeply it
only confirms my view that America doesn't have the kind of ethos sufficient
to sustain the reality of what Lincoln was and what he was about.
Levinson: I find it a little bit surprising that you value him so much
because preserving the Union can easily be put within a framework of idolatry.
Hauerwas: Oh, absolutely.
Levinson: He "shot" certainly as much as anybody at Fort Sumter and
some would say more. He chose to go to war. There is no portrayal of
Lincoln which makes him a plausible pacifist.
Hauerwas: Oh, he's not that at all. I think one of the difficulties about
being a pacifist is you are always put in such a minority position that you
think that everyone else's willingness to go to war is because they are morally
perverse. I do not think that people go to war and participate in war because
they are morally perverse. I think most people never even have the choice to
think about it. I don't think Lincoln ever seriously considered what it might
mean to have a nonviolent alternative. Pacifists care more about conscientious
participation than those in the war do. You get so few people conscientiously
participating.
The reason why I value Lincoln, as I said, is because I think that he
articulated a public sense of the tragedy of the war, in the Second Inaugural
and many other places, that could really help us as a people if we could own
that history. To appreciate what it means for a mature polity to have a
discourse that associates its history in a way that its citizens can be working
on a common project without it turning into idolatry. For example, how
does Lincoln mean for us to handle the continuing problem of blacks in
America? Supposedly they've got civil rights, so now we try to deal with the
continuing problem of how to remember we were a slave nation by saying,
What's a little slavery between friends? I mean, you, too, have the same
rights that we do-have two cars, live in a nice suburb, three TVs, and worry
about Jews moving in. Blacks now get to have the same disadvantages that
we currently have in terms of what makes our lives seemingly worthy.
So I find Lincoln's sensitivities on these points to be quite important, if
we could own them. I don't say it would be great. My problem is that even
if we could recover some sense of "civic republicanism" within the liberal
democratic system it would still be armed. So even if America could become
a virtuous polity I would still be worried. But Lincoln's sense of virtue in
this tragic sense-I think that is a sign of a mature polity that would be
better than the narrative that we place him in, namely the narrative of our
ongoing victory, where slavery is no problem anymore: We got rid of slavery;
we fought this terrible war; we got rid of the final products of discrimination
that was part of slavery, supposedly, so we are on our way to being a just
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society. I think that is just all false. That is the history that we read Lincoln
in.
LaRue: I still don't understand your total response to Sandy's point in
terms of your reference to your saying, "It would still be armed."
Hauerwas: Republican virtues are always armed. They are armed virtues.
Courage is armed.
LaRue: I mean, you're not going to be able to claim Lincoln as an ally
with that. You can't do it with the Second Inaugural.
Hauerwas: No, no, that's quite right. I think that the virtues, when
they're armed, if they're coupled with the kind of sense of ambiguity and
tragedy that you find in the Second Inaugural-at least they don't kill quite
so readily.
LaRue: Well, I'm still going to fight with you that the Second Inaugural
is an account of ambiguity and tragedy. The statement that's made in the
Second Inaugural is that if for every drop of blood shed by the lash there
must be another life lost, then we must recognize that the judgments of the
Lord are righteous.
Hauerwas: That's right.
LaRue: Now, what I want to say is that the thing that's attractive to me
about Lincoln is the Old Testament sense of that.
Hauerwas: Right. Your reading is probably more closely correct than
mine. Boys in gray pray, boys in blue pray. They pray to the same God.
LaRue: Yes, pray to the same God and the same God is punishing both.
Hauerwas: Right.
LaRue: And his judgments are righteous and we cannot complain about
this. I think he's right. And, second, on this peaceful alternative, I think it's
positively silly to say that there was a peaceful alternative.
Hauerwas: I agree. That's what I said. I don't think there was. And
that's the tragedy.
LaRue: And to take up another of your comments before. If there are
things worth dying for-I do also think there are things worth killing for.
Hauerwas: Well, the reason why I think Christians turn out to be such
enthusiastic killers is because originally they were such enthusiastic diers.
That's exactly the move that I think is natural and wrong. The fact of your
willingness to die doesn't translate into willingness to kill, but you are quite
right in the moral logic of that. But I do think that the more serious question
is, even if Sandy is right in terms of how Lincoln is being interpreted, that's
not how Lincoln works in the main story of America, if we're going to locate
verities. I mean it works primarily as we won; we were successful.
Shaffer: It was a cause worth dying for.
Hauerwas: And it was a cause worth dying for-right-and worth killing
for. That sense of judgment that you see in the Second Inaugural we just
don't have, because we won. It would be nice if we could get Sandy's Lincoln
into the story. I'm not so happy with getting the other part that you suggest
in the story, namely that the Declaration of Independence is the real Constitution. Because I don't like the Declaration of Independence. I always say
that America is the only country that has the disadvantage of being founded
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on a philosophical mistake, namely the notion of inalienable rights.
Levinson: From another perspective, Gary Wills doesn't like the Gettysburg Address because it's propositional and, if that's the proposition, then
we get in very quick fashion to loyalty oaths again, or a test of attachment
to the Constitution, with the notion that we know what that means, so,
"Here's a proposition: yea or nay."
LaRue: Again, Lincoln gives you a reading of the Declaration, one which
Gary Wills happens not to like but one which I think is a very good one.
On the thesis, he says that the proposition of the Declaration is equality, but
he also says that people aren't equal in everything. In the Springfield address
he specifies what people are not equal in; they are not equal in, among other
things, as he says-a surprising proposition-their moral worth. He says they
are equal in the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That is
the way that you found a polity of a certain sort which, by the way, seems
to me a rather better way to have found it than the particular history or the
particular geography.
Then I'll have to go to something else. Another piece of history I heard
asserted today is one that seems to me absolutely astonishing. That is that
the Puritan imaginations of equality, and the Calvinist thing, and all like
that, were part of the fundamental founding of America. I think, historically,
it is almost easy to establish that the Puritan communities of New England
were atypical for the American colonies. Most of the American colonies were
more like the English homelands. Puritan New England was self-consciously
and substantively different, and it's a further fact that New England is
marginal to American politics until 1830. It's no accident that we had a
stream of Virginia presidents; it's no accident that certain places were chosen
as central locations-Philadelphia and New York, and then later the banks
of the Potomac. The political and moral center of gravity of the United
States is in the Chesapeake area, and the Chesapeake area generally runs the
country for its first four decades or so. And that's a group of people who
are not Puritans. If you look at the iconography of the early republic it's all
classical emphasis with very little of Calvinist concepts.
Hauerwas: You don't think that Sandy's construal of the Preamble is
correct.
LaRue: I don't think it's a Calvinist proposition. I don't think it has
anything to do with Calvinism. The only way you can do that is to read the
intellectual hegemony and moral hegemony of New England, circa 1835,
backwards, and say it was always that way. The point is that the United
States from 1776 to, say, 1836, has its intellectual and moral center of gravity
well south of New England. The reason people write histories that start off
with and pay so much attention to New England is because it's the only part
of colonial America you can write a history about and not talk about slavery,
and so you write histories that shove all of that under the water.
Hauerwas: That's interesting. I've never thought of that; it's fascinating.
LaRue: Well, it's of course a fact that the histories that were written
were generally written at Harvard and Yale. The great historians that start
us off, say 1835 and forward, are New Englanders, in the New England
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universities. There's no doubt that New England establishes its intellectual
and moral hegemony in the nation, but it does so I think way too late in
the game to identify it with a founding document. One of the things that's
interesting about Lincoln is that he's one of the guys that makes the
assimilation. He's the guy that somehow manages to combine Jefferson and
Emerson in a dazzling tour de force, and thus in that sense he's a founder.
Tushnet: This last discussion suggested to me how to get a handle on
why I don't find Lincoln a particularly interesting figure in my narrative. Let
me start by picking up on Lash's observation that he's one of the few people
who teach Lincoln in constitutional law. What that says to me is not that
there is a standard story of Lincoln, but in the legal tradition he is just
absent. It seems to me no accident that Sandy, with his interest in Lincoln,
has a Ph.D. in political science, because the political scientists appear to be
interested in Lincoln. But not lawyers, in general.
Levinson: Just American-thought buffs and the political scientists.
Tushnet: Let me sort of translate this a little. The narrative about the
Constitution shared by the legal profession in general, as educated by legal
academics who don't have Lincoln as part of their universe of discourse, is
yet again different from the different ones that are being articulated here.
Then what I am led to think-but I'm not sure what you, Stanley, would
say about it-is that it's wrong, incomplete or something, to identify a
narrative that constitutes the community. It seems to me then there are two
obvious routes-maybe more-but two obvious ones. The community is
constituted by multiple narratives, which are drawn upon in shifting ways,
and it would be interesting to think about why they were drawn upon and
under what circumstances, and so forth. Or, alternatively, each of these
narratives constitutes a different community, and each one is, in its imagination, imperialistic with respect to the other.
Levinson: One reason Lash may be one of the few people teaching
Lincoln is because he doesn't appear or didn't appear in any of the standard
casebooks. If you assume that most people who teach are by and large at
the mercy of what's handed them, part of what's interesting is what we hand
them. Both Mark and I are involved with casebooks. 40 Mark's has become,
I think, the most widely accepted and most important one. Now yours, Mark,
is historically oriented as casebooks go, particularly because of Cass Sunstein,
and I think what's interesting about Cass is that he's up to his neck in the
Federalist Papers, and a certain version of the republican tradition-but my
impression is that Lincoln doesn't play any role in your book.
Tushnet: Well, we have the statement about the Dred Scott decision, but
that's all.
Levinson: But in the next edition of ours, Lincoln is going to be a main
character by anybody's criterion. And I remain relatively uninterested in The

40. G. STONE, L. SEmmAN, C. SUNsTaN & M. TusmIEr, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986); S.
LEVINSON AND P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEcISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIAlS
(2d ed. 1984).
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FederalistPapers. I read some of them on occasion, but I have never brought
myself to get all that involved with The FederalistPapers. I don't see them
as a particularly privileged kind of wisdom. Whether it's conscious picking
and choosing within the narrative, or it's just worked out that way, that we
are looking at different people, and those people who choose either of our
books will find themselves perhaps teaching more history than they had been
doing before, if they had used Gunther's book.41 But they'll be teaching
decidedly different histories.
Hauerwas: I think that Mark's point, though, is well taken for those of
us trained in Christian ethics. For a long time the assumption was that you
were being trained in something like American studies at the same time. We
were all brought up on Perry Miller 42 and Ahlstrom 3 and all that kind of
thing. That was part and parcel of my training, and it was part of my
training because the assumption was, as I have said time and time again,
that the subject of Christian ethics in America has always been America. We
thought we were theologians in order to make America coherent, to make
America work. That's what Christian theology was about.
You were interested in social ethics. So Lincoln became part, at least, of
my discourse. He probably forms a different story than he does in constitutional law, and plays a still different story within some aspects of American
political science. What we have here is a melding of different academic
cultures. I don't teach Lincoln anymore. And I don't have my students do
much American studies either, except as a negative case. So it does denote a
difference of academic cultures now, and what that means then for communities-I don't think communities have to have one story, but I think they
have to have a shared sense of what stories are important, that will give
them the kinds of lively arguments that are necessary for them to remain
coherent.
That's MacIntyre's account of tradition, namely, tradition is that which
will give you a recognizable argument across generations. Obviously MacIntyre
is thinking of two things-really three things. I think he thinks that the only
communities which exemplify that account of tradition are Judaism, the
development of the doctrine of Christianity (which includes Plato and Aristotle), and science. I think he thinks contemporary science is still a lively
traditional activity. I don't think MacIntyre would regard the United States
of America, for example, as a community in any interesting sense. And
exactly for that reason MacIntyre doesn't think that you've got much of a
stake in saving it, one way or the other. All you've got is fragments; you
don't have anything enough. I expect that people in constitutional law react
negatively against that because, on the whole, you think you're telling a story.
It's like Talmud. You go ahead and spell out the different meanings of this

41.
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within that. That's one of the reasons why I think the law has been trying
to protect itself against other disciplines informing what you do, because as
long as you're a lawyer you can tell such a coherent story. You start mixing
it up with political theory and economic analysis and it becomes a good deal
messier, and you can't preserve the law as that kind of coherent story.
Shaffer: You're using MacIntyre to make that point. It may be significant.
What do you do with the simple fact that these patriotic liturgies-and
Lincoln has often been a part of them-move Americans. You watch a
baseball game start with The Star Spangled Banner, and they all stand there,
and if a couple of the players talk to one another during The Star Spangled
Banner, we disapprove of it. And we say the Pledge of Allegiance. When
you go to public meetings, Stanley, do you say the Pledge of Allegiance?
Hauerwas: No I don't. Nor do I sing The Star Spangled Banner.
Shaffer: You stand up though.
Hauerwas: I do stand up.
Tushnet: Why? Let me not make this about you. Direct it towards me,
and just let me give my example, which is going to the university convocation
services, which are religious services.
Hauerwas: I wouldn't kneel if I were you.
Tushnet: No, I don't kneel. There's no kneeling. But there's a portion
where the standing is a part of the service, and I do it.
Hauerwas: I do it because, one, I want to honor the people there. I
respect the people who are doing the singing, and I don't want to show them
disrespect. Also, if I thought it was important to make a significant protest
gesture in those contexts, I might well do so, but I don't see any reason that
that would be necessary. So those would be the only two reasons that I do
stand, and also you don't want to call too much attention to yourself. Let
me say that Jeff Stout argues in his book, After Babel," that we've got
practices around that we can still sustain as ethics of the virtues, that we can
maintain a kind of moderate liberalism, and one of the practices that he likes
very much is baseball. He doesn't think it has yet been corrupted thoroughly
by the institution. I'm a big baseball fan, too. Indeed, I say that today the
only kind of working criteria I can give to someone who might make me
think it might be worthy to engage in some kind of defensive strategy to
save America is if you can show me how there is a necessary relationship
between saving America and keeping Carolina League Class A ball going.
I've given up on the major leagues, but I don't want to lose the Durham
Bulls. When people ask me, "What will happen if the Communists take
over" my answer is, "Well, will they make it impossible for us to play Class
A ball in Durham?" If they don't, I think saving America is still a viable
possibility. I think this is a narrative that I'm interested in saving.
Levinson: Let me raise a hypothetical that I mentioned to Tom as we
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were walking back over here. What if it were proposed to drop the constitutional oath that lawyers need to take? I assume that each of us who is a
lawyer has signed this loyalty oath if he is a member of the Bar. It's a stance
pretty much that tracks the presidential oath; it's not a "I'm not a Communist
and I will never be one," but it simply says I promise I'll support, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States-and of California in my
case. You're probably committed to the Indiana Constitution. Is that right?
Shaffer: Yes, and to never refusing a case for filthy lucre's sake.
Levinson: What if someone said this is either silly or offensive and let's
rationalize our practices and drop the oath. Would you as a member of the
laity, in this context-would you applaud us for doing that?
Hauerwas: Yes, I would. I think it would be great.
Tushnet: Is that because you, in this present context, agree with MacIntyre
that there is no viable constitutional tradition sufficient to support the dialogue
across generations?
Hauerwas: Yes. I don't believe that we are a viable political society.
Shaffer: Would you go to a mechanic to get your car fixed who didn't
adhere to sound principles of internal combustion?
Hauerwas: I might well do it, not knowing any better, I mean from what
I know about a car.
Shaffer: Or a doctor who didn't believe in scientific medicine? It seems
to me there is a connection there to lawyers making some sort of commitment
to the stuff that they deal with, which you're buying from them.
Hauerwas: Well, I assume that that's done within the profession.
LaRue: I don't know what that has to do with an oath.
Levinson: Let me offer a solution. I think we can, and many of us not
only can but do, treat the lawyer as a rhetorician, in a platonic sense. We
are skilled in manufacturing arguments, and we're trained to know how
arguments work, and just as I want somebody who knows how internal
combustion engines work to fix my car, I want to go to a lawyer who
graduated magna from an institute of rhetoric to manufacture arguments that
will help me prevail. But this has almost literally nothing to do with supporting, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the United States. The
question is to what extent the role of a lawyer in some significant sense is
linked to membership in a constitutional community, where one asks about
the implications of one's actions in terms of that constitutional community,
as opposed to being a good neutral technician for sale to the highest bidder.
I don't think getting rid of the oath would in the least require us to shut
down the law schools we now teach in. Presumably one of the arguments
for getting rid of the oath is that it would simply bring our practices and
our theory closer together, because we make no real effort to discuss with
our students what it means seriously to commit yourself to a life of supporting,
protecting, and defending the Constitution of the United States. That's
certainly not what goes on in most constitutional law courses, including my
own. It certainly doesn't go on in the general curriculum, where constitutional
law gets fewer hours than commercial law, for example, which is the important
stuff of the law school.
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Hauerwas: I think that's right. I just don't see how a drop in the oath
would make all that much difference.
Powell: Not everybody looks at teaching constitutional law that way, of
course, Sandy. There are naive believers among us.
Levinson: I wouldn't say that no one does. I'm simply saying that as a
descriptive practice I don't think that the constitutional law course elicits
from students, or forces upon students, which may also be the right word,
serious reflection about whether you want to get married to the law in
essence-the old clich6 from the Harvard Law School of law being a jealous
mistress, and the idea that the oath is transformative in some sense, and that
you do take on real responsibilities. If you teach this, more power to you.
We don't have an argument. But I'm simply asserting as a matter of sociology
that this isn't the subject matter of most constitutional law courses.
Shaffer: I think that's because constitutional law is too frail a subject to
bear it. I think if that subject is talked about at all in legal education it's
talked about in ethics.
Powell: Or contracts. I talk about it-I teach contracts, and that's one
of the things I talk about. We were talking about it at breakfast, the question
about how much one can succeed in doing this, but one of the things I
conceive myself to be doing is getting my students to understand what it is,
and whether they want to be what it is, that a commercial lawyer is. You
may be right as a descriptive matter, although I think that is an empirical
assertion.
Shaffer: I think that's true for a very important reason, and that is that
those subjects cannot avoid dealing with relationships.
LaRue: I think you also have to recognize part of this in terms of what
the oaths would stand for and not stand for are the discontinuities within
the profession itself. It's fairly routine to say, and I think reasonably accurate
to say, that there is not a single esprit de corps, a single group of people
you call lawyers, nor is there a single activity that you can call lawyering.
Sandy mentioned the making of arguments of the rhetorician. We spend an
enormous amount of time on that in law school, but it's not that big. I was
a litigator; that was the heart of my practice when I was practicing, so of
course I did spend a lot of time doing that. But even as a litigator this
particular function was not the main function. Negotiating settlements, particularly since I was a criminal lawyer, and most of my clients were guiltyit was of course the proper thing that one did. That's not making arguments;
of course, in negotiation you argue, but not in the sense in which Sandy I
think was alluding to. The subject of rhetoric is one of the things which one
does teach in law school. But once you move over into the commercial world,
the making of arguments, I think, is a smaller part. Drafting is a huge part;
counseling is a huge part. As Tom says, you are dealing with relations here;
you are structuring these other things. There is not a single thing.
Levinson: But the oath-it's not a Hippocratic Oath that we take. I
mean one can imagine a lawyer's version of the Hippocratic Oath, in which
we promise to be of service to our clients, and never inflict unjustified
suffering on adversaries, and to negotiate fairly-
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Powell: North Carolina lawyers take such an oath.
Levinson: They do?
Powell: I pledged myself truly and honestly to practice the law, to the
best of my knowledge and ability.
Levinson: But there is a separate oath to support, protect, and defend
the Constitution. It's very different from promising to be a competent lawyer.
I think it is a political statement, so we can now get into two different
conversations. One is whether it would be a good idea for the A.B.A. to
work up a version of the North Carolina oath, or something else, a Hippocratic Oath for the modem lawyer. And then the second question would still
be what to do with this specific oath of constitutional fidelity. Keep it or
drop it? And if we keep it, why?
Tushnet: When Jeff was talking about the naive people like him who do
teach this, and about your ambivalence, but nonetheless, it seems to me,
commitment in the book to the idea that there is something to the oathLevinson: There's a "there" there.
Tushnet: There's a "there" there, right. I have to say I recoil from that,
because there's a level at which I want to say you can't seriously want people
to commit their moral being to that, where that refers to the body of stuff
that is the constitutional tradition.
Powell: Of course. You've just reformulated in significantly different
terminology what everyone else is saying. And, yes, if I let you reformulate
it, I'll say no I won't; no, I can't seriously want to do that.
Tushnet: So what is the key reformulation that I did? Committing your
moral being?
Shaffer: Yes, spell that out a little bit.
Tushnet: I take taking an oath to mean assimilating a commitment to
that thing to which you are taking an oath into your sense of your own
being. It's not the only thing, it's not the only commitment.
Shaffer: And if that's what you mean by the Constitution, you mean
something more than the text.
Tushnet: What I mean is all of that stuff. And all of that stuff, on the
whole, strikes me as not terribly attractive. If it is an oath to support, defend,
and protect the good things about the world, I'll take that, but to call that
the Constitution, or to call the Constitution that, seems to me overreaching.
Powell: Why? How?
Tushnet: There are two versions of it. One is that the Constitution as
tradition is much more than that and, therefore, much less attractive than
all the good things in the world. Or, alternatively, which is I think why I tie
this initially to Stanley's mention of MacIntyre, there is no viable constitutional tradition, and so the oath is the form of assimilating something into
one's being without the reality.
Powell: But Mark, you've clearly got, I think, an implicit notion about
what is and is not within the constitutional tradition. You just said that
doesn't exist. You were implying an aspirational view-what the Constitution
is at heart is the Declaration of Independence or some other set of aspirations,
the Preamble or whatever, and you wanted to say that it is overreaching to
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define it that way. And then to accept that as a moral value would be
overreaching. And that is because you have an implicit notion of what lies
in and out of the tradition. If not, I don't know how you make the judgment.
Tushnet: That's fair enough. And, as I said, these were alternatives.
Either it is a tradition that has some stuff inside and some stuff outside it,
that's unattractive; or it isn't, in which case it's a fiction.
Powell: Or, as Barber would say, 45 no, there is a third possibility. There
is a tradition, and the truest training of tradition is in the aspirational things
that are attractive. The other stuff is deviations, valuesLevinson: That's what I call the happy ending view. That, it seems to
me, is to remove all the elements of tragedy and get rid of the notion of a
tradition and the burdens of a tradition, because by definition it becomes
only that which you like for extrinsic reasons. But one can imagine playing
with different forms of oaths, and it is obvious that this is something I enjoy
doing. I often ask my students who take umbrage at my attack on judicial
supremacy, "Okay, you don't like my notions, and think that the Court
really is something special, how about amending the Constitution to have the
president say 'I promise to support, protect, and defend the Constitution, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court,' " and quite amazingly almost no student
has ever endorsed that amendment. Some will say that's kind of what it
means already, and there's no need to spell it out, but there's also something
that suddenly bothers them about going that route.
But one can imagine the standard oath and then a clause limited only
by overriding moral precepts, so this saves you from what I think we all
agree is the fatal problem of committing your soul to an enterprise that could
lead you down an immoral path. But that could, if you take oaths seriously,
still have real bite for lawyers-in terms of simply selling your rhetorical
services to the highest bidder, or a number of other things that mean you
still might be constrained in the performance of your role. Or some people
might think that you would be constrained in the performance of your role
in a way that you wouldn't be if you simply promised to help your clients
get whatever they wanted and to treat them with compassion, and stuff like
that. Would that satisfy your concerns about oath taking? I would like that
kind of oath because it would force you to grapple with serious moral
questions. A double oath to two important things would be even better than
a single oath to one important thing, if you believe oaths are at all desirable,
ever.
Tushnet: I guess I'm hesitant here because I see problems in each of the
alternatives that I identified before. I would not want to take an oath
formulated so as to define important overriding moral concerns as outside
the Constitution. That's at least something that ought to be contested within
the framework of the Constitution. And, on the other alternative there's no
tradition, so that taking an oath is not a coherent thing to do. I guess I'd
be inclined to think that, when formulated as "overriding moral concerns,"
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there's probably no tradition there, either, as we haven't added anything to
it. You have nothing to begin with, and you haven't added anything. I take
it that Stanley would say that if the second clause were "support, defend,
and protect the Constitution subject to Christian ethics" that would at least
bring it into the framework of an intelligible thing to do. The first part
would be meaningless, but at least the second part would have some meaning,
and you could do something about that.
Shaffer: It would make it unnecessary, though. Why would you have to
take an oath like that?
Tushnet: Indeed, you can't take an oath like that. You can just live like
that.

Hauerwas: Let me make a more general kind of comment about this
discussion. I told Jeff-when I read Sandy's book, and I know that Sandy
meant this, probably-that I got the distinct impression that these are the
issues we used to debate in theology and still do. They don't make any
difference now in the seminaries-but now the law schools have become the
place where the more important theological issues in society are thought out.
In the nineteenth century, in the Anglican Church, there was a famous debate
over whether one had to agree to all thirty-nine Articles in order to be
ordained. No one would think about getting that serious today, I don't think,
within the Church, because we're just happy to get somebody that will still
hang around. I wonder if all the questions about oath taking-the seriousness,
apart from the issues of whether there is coherent constitutional traditionreally have to do with maintaining the integrity and importance of the law
for our society, as a place where the serious matters of the society get debated
out. Why it is so important, for example, that law schools today still seem
to offer moral formation of the students, whether negatively or positively,
but it's still some kind of moral formation. So the question of oath-taking
is really a kind of religious question and not just a question within the
constitutional law about oath-taking.
Shaffer: I think that's absolutely right. I've found in the things that my
ethics students wrote recently a number of students who said that a lawyer
should never disobey the law. And I got tired of writing in the margin,
"Nobody with a conscience would ever say that."
Hauerwas: The law becomes the new Bible. And Sandy's quite right:
You've got your fundamentalists within the law and you've got your liberals
within the law. You are recapitulating what people used to think were our
significant debates.
Tushnet: Although there are a couple of things that occur to me. One is
that if your proposition about law schools as a locus for moral formation is
right, then the oath is just a metaphor for legal education as a whole.
Hauerwas: That's right. That's what I'm suggesting. And the preserving
of legal education is a way of having integrity, significance, and importance.
I interpret the rise of legal positivists, where you want to separate the law
and the meaning of the law from any determinative moral community, to be

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:467

a response to the moral anarchy of our world and a way to secure the
continued moral coherence of the law. So the law has a kind of logic in
itself, that gives us a sense of how to go on. Sandy's book tells a story of
how these kinds of arguments within the law give us a narrative that is much
more coherent than we have as the narrative of wider society. You've got a
community that you can debate. That's what you don't have if you step out
into any of the other academic disciplines within the university today. The
law is surprisingly, wonderfully coherent, and legal positivism saves it.
Tushnet: I think you've said things like that before, and I think maybe
that's the way it looks from the outside, from somebody whose discipline
used to have that, who is nostalgically longing for that again, looking around.
But from the inside of the law school...
Hauerwas: It doesn't feel that way.
Tushnet: . . .it doesn't feel like that. That's putting it a little more
strongly than it should be put, but, given my identification with Critical
Legal Studies, what I can say is, whether or not people have bought the
Critical Legal Studies line on this stuff, it has shaken a lot of people up.
The sense that they have been confronted with powerful arguments from
within, that the coherence that they thought was there isn't there. That's part
of the reaction to it. Now my view is that it's just not there, that these
critical arguments are correct.
Levinson: I think you are also right that the oath argument is a proxy
for an argument about legal education. I think a recurrent argument in law
schools is education for "citizenship," to what degree that is part of what
law school ought to be about. One of the things we were talking about at
lunch was the fact that Washington and Lee has just made a course in civil
liberties required. I assume that the rationale is because you want to train
citizens. I assume that most of your students are relatively unlikely to practice
civil liberties law.
LaRue: A reasonable prediction.
Levinson: It's not valuable skills training that you're after. This is a
debate at our law school which I must say I've lost. I would like to require
not only civil liberties but also criminal procedure, which is, at our school,
not a requirement. You take either criminal law or criminal procedure, but
you don't have to take both. It seems to me scandalous that a lot of our
students graduate knowing nothing about the actual operations of the criminal
justice system. I don't think you pick it up by studying criminal law. But
the debate is very clearly a debate between citizen education and skills training.
The empirically correct argument directed against me is that our students
aren't going to practice criminal law. Those who will practice criminal law
take the criminal justice courses the same way that those who want to practice
tax take tax courses. It also goes back to what we were talking about this
morning-the willingness to intervene and impose substantive values on people
who would choose otherwise.
LaRue: Did you debate the issue of requiring a civil liberties course at
any length, or was it simply something that the community spoke on with
one voice? Ann, weren't you involved here at Washington and Lee?
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Massie: What did we debate? I think it kind of started before I even
came. I remember someone quoted me in-a faculty meeting for my phrase
"legal literacy." Because I guess I have a sense that there is a coherent story,
perhaps-although you say you don't think so. I thought it was important
that that be passed on. There was some debate, but I don't recall very much
of a position to the notion. I think there was a kind of sense that it is
deplorable that the students haven't acted to acquire this for themselves, and,
since they haven't, we thinkLevinson: We're distinctly more libertarian in Texas.
LaRue: My memory is as yours, Ann. The historical detail is that we
had a constitutional law course in the first year that taught structural parts,
and then a civil-liberties, upper-class course and it was elective. And we
changed the focus of the first-year course and we increased the number of
hours in the second-year course, and made it required, so that now there is
a package of about seven hours of required public law offerings, as the
package is described.
Levinson: We've got a package of six. And the first term is structurecommerce clause and stuff like that-and then students get to choose what
their advanced constitutional law course will be. I just finished teaching one
on equality. Doug Laycock will be offering one next semester, on a survey
of civil liberties. But what this means, among other things, is that a very
significant percentage of our students will graduate knowing nothing about
either the race narrative or the civil-liberties narrative, as conventionally
defined, because we don't require it.
Shaffer: Does it add anything to your notion, that that sort of thing is
education for citizenship, to say that this is not just any citizen? It seems to
me the notion of the "republican" vision that's behind that is the specialcitizen notion: The lawyer takes on the burdens of leadership in the society,
rather more than other people.
Levinson: It's not "republican," because I don't applaud the fact that
lawyers take on these roles; but I think as an empirical matter they do. And
we ought to be responsible for that foreknowledge-that for better or worse
our graduates are not a random group, and they are likely to be in leadership
positions. The "republican" vision saw this as a terrific thing, and I don't
want to affiliate with that strand of republicanism.
Hauerwas: This helps me say why I think that the constitutional tradition
is finally not coherent. It's not that I think it's not coherent within itself,
because I think there's a lot of coherence within it-in how the law developed,
in terms of the conversation, from one set of cases to another. It strikes me
as extremely odd to say the law school is a place where you train people in
citizenship, just as it's just as odd, but is also the case, that divinity schools
have increasingly become places where we train people to be Christians.
Supposedly we train people to be ministers, presupposing the vitality and
viability of the church. But as a matter of fact, since we can no longer
presuppose that vitality, in effect many of our students come trying to
discover not whether they are going to be ministers, but whether they are
going to be Christians. They in the process oftentimes decide both to be
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Christians and ministers, but these are not necessarily related. Sometimes
they decide not to be Christians but to be ministers anyway. Literally, there
are four possibilities.
I'm very serious. It's a very odd situation, which connotes that seminary
education has become problematic exactly because we cannot any longer
presuppose the kinds of practices that make it intelligible for people to be
called into the ministry to begin with. After all, the fact of a profession
being coherent means that it must be how people are called out to be
specialized, in a way that the community understands, that these are goods
that it's important to have people specialized in. Now, the law, I take it, has
those kinds of goods, too. They depend upon being able to depend upon a
civic republic of some kind or the other. That gives the law coherence. It's
just about as absurd to say the law schools today are about training people
in citizenship as it is to say that seminaries are training people to be
Christians-or Jews. I would think Judaism is in no better shape than we
are on some of this. Therefore, the incoherence is that the constitutional
tradition isn't any longer recognized as dealing with matters that matter for
the general public, in a way that they see it as really their goods are involved.
That's the reason lawyers today have become esoteric, just like theologians
are esoteric, or physicians are esoteric.
Shaffer: No, I would say the opposite. I would say that lawyers have
become esoteric because of a failure of training in citizenship. I don't think
Sandy can avoid the republican tradition that says that it's training not just
for citizenship but for leadership. I just don't see how you can avoid that.
What you can say is that you don't like it. Maybe there is an analogy there,
but I don't think you have quite described it. In the Roman Catholic tradition
the training of the clergy involves the notion of formation, and I take it that
the notion of formation was to produce a model believer.
Hauerwas: No, I don't think that's right. It's a little like saying to
someone, "You're going to be set aside to do nothing but spend all your life
being around sick people." That's a very dangerous thing to do to somebody,
because sick people are really rather disgusting to be around all your life. To
always be about helping people will really screw you up. I mean the ministry
is involved in this kind of thing, too. And so you need to give physicians
special moral training, to be able to stand the demands of being so screwed
up, in terms of having such a narrow range of things to do. The same is
true of a professor. I'm set aside, supposedly, because the community says
that we value the fact that I will spend my life studying and trying to know
better what our culture has thought about the good, the true, and the
beautiful, so it wants me to spend most of my life reading books. Well, that
will screw you up. You'll need special formation to be half-way decent at
having that vocation. I take it that the same is true of the law. Namely, the
law sets aside people to do very specific things for a lifetime. You need
special formation.
Shaffer: In "constitutional faith."
Hauerwas: And in the practices that are associated with that, and the
ministry is the same way. The Catholic priest was the same way. It wasn't
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just the kind of formation that is true of every Christian; it's the kind of
formation that's true of those people you set aside specially to do nothing
but study scripture, serve the sacraments, etc, And the Catholics were quite
right to have done that. It is very hard for us anymore to say anything like
that, since no one believes in the kind of calling that is associated with being
so specialized. The goods that the different professions are to serve are no
longer agreed upon within the general culture, and that makes the very notion
of profession unintelligible.
Richardson: Presumably the Christians who arrive at seminary should
have learned their Christianity in the church. What would be the equivalent
institution for teaching good citizenship before law school?
Massie: The schools. The schools, I should think. But I remember when
I first went to law school I was continually struck by the notion that everyone
that got a good and decent education ought to learn these things in order to
be a responsible citizen. I really kept thinking that, and I thought it's a
tragedy that they don't, and I still do.
Levinson: If I could push that point back to the beginning of this
particular conversation: What would you want your kids to learn about
Lincoln, if anything at all?
Hauerwas: Lash, what would you give as an answer? That he reasserted
the significance of the Declaration of Independence, as the constitutional
interpretation?
LaRue: Well, that's in fact what I've been teaching, so I have a vested
interest in it.
Levinson: Let's assume right now that we are talking about a ninth
grader taking a standard U.S. history course.
LaRue: I guess if I were doing it I think I would want them to read
some of the things that you might describe as "the collected works of
Abraham Lincoln," certain of the speeches. And the reason that I would do
so is that I would hope that the student would assimilate, unconsciously or
consciously, enough of that rhetoric so that it could become formative of
the way that the person looked at the world, That is, it would change the
eyeglasses, to use that metaphor, about what you would see. It would alter
the imagination.
Levinson: Would you want them to read the habeas corpus letter" where
Lincoln asks why should one law be obeyed when all the others aren't?
Shaffer: That's the problem with Lash's answer. They can handle that
if they first learn about Lincoln as a virtuous person. In fact, what my
generation of Americans heard about Lincoln was that he walked ten miles
to take the change back when he was given too much money. Stories like
that, which it seems to me every culture has, which fit in with Sandy's saying
Lincoln is a rabbi in the constitutional tradition, and that the rabbi is
respected because of his character. First of all, I know, somehow or other I
know, that Rabbi Joshua was a person of virtue, and then I respect him as
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a teacher. My kid can handle the habeas corpus cases if he first knows of
Lincoln as a virtuous person.
Levinson: Including walking through the snow.
Shaffer: All the little stories-I just buy it. I go down to the public
library and get the book, "Lincoln for Seven-Year-Olds," or whatever.
Levinson: So the question has to begin not with what do you do with
the ninth grader, but what do you do with the first grader and the second
grader. And you tell those stories. George Washington chopping down cherry
trees, and all that kind of stuff.
Shaffer: True stories, though.
Hauerwas: Well, better they be true. And then by the ninth grade one
would hope that they are ready to understand why that person would take
that view ofLevinson: Right. And why it would be all right for that person to break
the law, though not for Colonel North, say, or Jeff Davis.
Hauerwas: Surely it's break a law, not the law.
Levinson: A nice distinction.
Richardson: Well, what about when the citizenship taught in the schools
is bad?
Massie: Bad in what sense?
Richardson: Like it is in South Africa. When they push a set of values
down the kids' throats and you know the whole thing is morally rotten. It's
racist.
Levinson: I think that's what makes most people fearful about the notion
of citizen education and it's scarcely the case that citizenship education in
the United States would be without corruption. I think that most of us would
be very fearful. It's like sex education in a real way. We are not likely to be
in control of the curriculum, and many of us would make a pragmatic choice
that it is better not to teach this at all, because there is a sweetness-and-light
aspect to it. Presumably the kind of citizenship education I have in mind
would in fact go at least through Martin Luther King and that would be a
very, very different model of citizenship from the one most likely to be
accepted. But there I think, do you get into incessant struggles on the
curriculum, in which you are constantly fighting over what is going to be
taught in history courses, because you recognize this as absolutely central to
the formation of the culture and to its perpetuation? As Stanley might say,
and for all I know might have actually said, "He who controls the stories
controls the culture." Or do you try to construct the notion of education
that Mark may be alluding to, where the schools really don't do very much,
and it becomes a lesser evil sort of thing. It's just better that they not say
anything at all about citizenship than that we take a risk of losing the
struggle. 47

47. Hauerwas: Mark, do you support public education?
Tushnet: Yeah.
Hauerwas: Why?
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LaRue. I would say, to return to the Lincoln question, I think the one

way not to do that is exactly that which has been proposed, which is to tell
the silly little stories about walking ten miles in the snow and so forth. That
really seems to me an appalling way to educate. If that's what you mean by
character, and what you think about teaching Lincoln's character, then I
either don't agree with you about character, or I don't agree with you about

teaching. This seems to me a wrong way to go.
Levinson: What do you do if a student says, after you have given
whatever Lincoln materials you have given, if you don't include the ten-mile
walk or something similar to that, the student says, "Gee, Professor LaRue,
this sounds just like Oliver North. Now, I heard you denounce Oliver North.
Aren't these really the same?" Can you really choose between them on any
grounds other than you like Lincoln's values and you don't like North's?

Would you even talk about the character of the two men as relevant to your
assessment?
LaRue: I guess again it goes to what you mean by character. But it

seems to me that Lincoln is distinguishable from North on character, but
he's not distinguishable from North on character because he walked ten miles
through the snow to return a dime, because we know that that's exactly the
sort of act that a North will do. You've picked out the ludicrous part of the
Lincoln story to say that that's what you mean by character and so you
wind up with character defined in a Norman Rockwell sense, which I think
is really corrupting. Character is displayed in these circumstances by various

public performances and the public performances had to do with the humor,
the link between the humor and the intelligence, the way those are displayed

Tushnet: Because it's the great melting pot. All that sort of stuff.
Levinson: That is, the kids sit next to one another. But how about in terms of the substantive
materials.
Tushnet: Oh, well, you know-part of my response is-it's like the weather.
Hauerwas: I really believe that we are coming to the point that public education is over in
America and people are going to have to face that. How are you going to adjudicate questions
about public education in America, where some people are saying you can't read "The Wizard
of Oz" because it's got good witches in it, and other people are saying you can't read "Macbeth,"
because it is an inherently patriarchal narrative that is destructive of women? How in the world
are you going to negotiate that kind of issue for American public education? As a result,
American public education is going to become increasingly bland and distorting to any sense of
classics. Wouldn't we be better off saying, "Okay, let's give up on public education, and let's
start moving into different dissenting academies, or you won't even have anything to dissent
from; they'll just be different, and we'll let you use your tax chits to buy the kind of education
you want your kids to have"?
Tushnet: I don't have strong views on this, one way or the other. I guess I do have a
historian's qualms about saying "increasingly bland," and so forth. That is, my hunch is that
if you look at the universe of nine-year-olds in 1910, and the universe of nine-year-olds in 1987,
you're not going to find a higher concentration of blandness today than in the past. It's just
that the kids who were in schools in 1910 were a smaller proportion than the kids who are in
schools now. So, overall, I'm not sure there's been this sort of decline in whatever it is that's
happened.
Hauerwas: You may be right. It's an empirical question, but it does seem to me it's going
to be very hard to maintain coherent public education in this country.
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in certain forms of texts, the way they lead to certain judgments, and so
forth. Now it seems to me, if you are talking about a character worth teaching
and worth emulating, one of the things you can say is look, Ollie North
never wrote anything that looks like the Springfield speech, or the Gettysburg
Address, or the Second Inaugural. And why not? The reason is that mind is
not separate from character, and it is not separate from emotion. You don't
want to, I think, start a ground of educational pedagogy that sees those
things as separate. And I don't think that the reason that Lincoln's argument
about suspending habeas corpus, or those kinds of things-whatever he had
to do-is because there is something separate that we call character, and
we're happy about that, so therefore we trust this other act. I know my
judgment of Lincoln is not based on that kind of dichotomizing. And I
certainly don't want to teach it that way, I don't want to create a Norman
Rockwell Lincoln that we then suddenly spring the Second Inaugural on.
That seems to me an implausible notion.
Shaffer: Right. But the way you know character is in small things. The
fact that you can't distinguish North and Lincoln because of small acts of
honesty that would be told about them doesn't mean they are not distinguishable. It just means you've got to distinguish them some other way. Think of
the ordinary stories. How do you know people in the story are admirable?
It's because the writer shows you those people doing small things well,
LaRue: No, I think in Lincoln's case you'd see him doing big things
well.
Levinson: You'd look at humor, and virtually none of the humor involves
anything great. It's in pulling the leg of someone at the cabinet meeting. The
cabinet meeting may be great; the joke was probably small and sort of offcolor. And I agree with you on the influence of the humor as one side of
the complexity of the man; it's very important, but you are going to illustrate
it by small stories.
LaRue: It gets very sentimental at that point and, therefore, false.
Hauervas: I think character education is done primarily through examples, and of course the examples depend a lot on the teacher who's doing
the examples, I think-in terms of character education, rather than just about
Lincoln.

I want to ask Mark a question, as someone who has been identified with
the Crits. Take the analysis of the problem of education and citizenship that
we confront today, and its possible implications for the ability to sustain the
law as an enterprise that can really help us as a people. As Sandy says, "The
model of Protestant interpretation that I have in mind is not to isolate
individuals joined in anguished communication with their personal God but
rather the community joined together, basically in egalitarian discussion of
the meaning of man's relevant material." If you want to make that sense of
the law normative, as something very important for us to do, and increasingly
hard to do, given our very difficult problems sustaining civic education and
civic virtue-as a Crit, how do you feel about that? Is that good or bad?
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Tushnet: At least the first cut at it is that it's not bad to show that the
resources of the legal conversation can't sustain that kind of dialogue at that
point. For me the reason is that that way of talking about law glosses over
the lies, obscures from view its association with coercion, and its core form.
We talked earlier about metaphoric extensions. Metaphoric extensions of the
idea of coercion indicate that things outside the core are also problematic.
But you don't have to do any of the extensions to take as the model of a
conversation about law a Supreme Court decision that ends up saying it's
okay to kill you. Now, I have some ambivalence about the death penalty.
But it's real hard to keep up the image of law as a conversation when it
ends with somebody being killed as a result. And I just can't get away from
that. So that showing that the conversatioii within law can't be sustained
seems to me a good thing to do.
Shaffer: You make it sound like a theological debate in The Name of
the Rose. If you lose the argument, you lose your head.
Tushnet: Well, somebody does. For me, that has to be the core of talking
about law, that when the conversation ends, somebody walks away and
somebody is left on the ground.
Hauerwas: Do you then have a stake in maintaining something called
the legal enterprise?
Tushnet: I don't think I have a normative stake in maintaining the legal
enterprise. Now of course there is all of this stuff about how I have these
specialized skills that would be very difficult to redeploy in some other field,
and in that sense I have a stake, which I alluded to earlier when I talked
about moving to England. To that extent, yes, I have a stake, but I don't
think it is a normative stake. At least I don't feel it. I don't think I feel it.
That gets back to my concern about the oath.
Let me repeat this so that there'll be some publication in which this
occurs because I liked it and it never did appear. In Sandy's work he has
this "do you sign the Constitution?" article which he did last year.4m He
asked me how I would respond to the question, "Would you sign the
Constitution?" when it was presented as the scroll that they were displaying
in Philadelphia, that people were asked to sign. My first reaction was, "Well,
I don't know. Probably not." But then I thought about it and it occurred
to me that I could, because the Constitution doesn't really mean anything,
or it means whatever I want it to mean. It occurred to me that that was
even more dramatically driven home by the fact that I was being asked to
sign a blank piece of paper. The thing that was going to be put in front of
me was a blank piece of paper: So, sure, I'll sign that. Now, it's in that
sense that I'd say I don't have that kind of stake in the enterprise. It is
partly because I don't think there is an enterprise. This is the second of my
alternatives: There is no coherent, viable tradition that is sufficient to sustain
the conversation across generations.

48. Levinson, PledgingFaith in the Civil Religion: Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?,
29 WrM. & MARY L. REv. 113 (1987).
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Hauerwas: How do you respond to that, Sandy?
Levinson: I certainly think that might be the case. And I certainly
disbelieve in what appear to be the standard ways of talking about a
constitutional tradition-that is, Supreme Court cases as the sacred repository.
I think the central difference between Mark and me may be more simply
personal: I feel myself caught up in this question in a way that I don't think
Mark is. I'm not being critical. I think it's a statement simply of the different
biographies of the two of us. I am driven by certain questions and one of
them is how I stand in relation to this stuff and what the consequences would
be of really and truly coming to agree with Mark that there is no there there.
I certainly teach that as a very strong possibility, and I am certainly skeptical
of the various moves offered by the people who are confident that there is
a there there. That is, they say, "Just read it, or find out what James
Madison said," or use the variety of standard approaches that I know I
don't believe in. Then the question is how do you construct something out
of everything else, including what's written down, and what James Madison
said, and lots of other stuff besides. Does that end up as anything more than
highly partial, highly idiosyncratic? If it's not a completely individual reading-I don't believe in individual readings-is it a reading confined to my
little subcommunity but in no plausible way a narrative that would speak to
anybody outside of that tiny subcommunity?
I got originally interested in all of this at the time of Watergate, quite
specifically as a result of Barbara Jordan's comment, and not knowing what
to do with it, not knowing what to do with all the articles written by very
eminent liberals on the rule of law, knowing that there was a discontinuity
between the kind of legal realism that I was educated in as a graduate student.
Not in law school, but at Harvard as a graduate student-not taking the rule
of law very seriously as an operational ideal, being much too sophisticated a
political scientist to believe in it-and then suddenly there was this outpouring
of articles. I have always remembered one, Arthur Schlesinger writing somewhere-The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, it doesn't matter;
Sam Ervin emerging as a constitutional hero; and then Barbara Jordan with
her faith in the Constitution, and I trying to figure out for myself what to
do with this stuff. I certainly approved of bashing Richard Nixon, but I
wasn't sure I approved the argument by which he was bashed, because he
or James St. Clair was smart enough to evoke the Lincoln analogy. And
nobody took it seriously. Rightly or wrongly, nobody took it seriously.
LaRue: There's a chapter in my forthcoming book4 9 about not taking it
seriously.
Levinson: It's not that nobody took it seriously, in the sense that they
said, "Yes, Nixon, you're right," but I didn't even see any discussion about
it, and that was really the beginning of this whole enterprise. One question
I continue to have is how idiosyncratic this feeling is, of being caught up in
this problem. I'm sure I'm not unique, because I don't believe in uniqueness,

49. L. H. LARuE, PoLmcAL DiscoURsE: A CASE STUDY OF THE WATERGATE AnFAm (1988).
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but is this really a very small subgroup, or will this in fact speak to a wider
audience who will say, "Yeah, you know I find myself thinking about these
things too; you have made certain inchoate thoughts choate"? Or will they
say, "Why are you interested in this? Grow up"?
Tushnet: In your enumeration of ways out of the problem, I think it's
important to include the sort of aspirational constitution which Barber alludes
to50 and why that's not a solution to these difficulties. What is your response
to someone who says, "Wait a minute. Of course you could have an
unambiguous commitment to the aspirational constitution. There's nothing
to be ambiguous about there"? What do you say?
Levinson: Well, I'd say two things, one of which is shockingly textual,
and that's simply that the aspirational constitution has problems with the
1808 clause, and whether a conscientious lawyer could believe that Congress
could stop the international slave trade prior to 1808. It seems to me that,
in terms of any sort of orthodox legal analysis, we can make certain moves
that would present an argument. But I think orthodox legal analysis would
say that it would be unconstitutional to do so. So that aspiration has its
limits at that point. That's where tragedy would enter.
Tushnet: Wait a minute. I think the response to that is the aspirational
constitution means the best that can be done at any particular time, so thatLevinson: The view I'm trying to present is the most respect-worthy view
of the Constitution you can come up with, recognizing there's always the
possibility that even the best you can do is going to leave you gasping for
breath and wanting to move to something else. That is the view that I've
ended up taking. If I am asked how do I view the constitutional enterprise,
that is the way I view it. Now the obvious problem with that second point
is the pluralism of values. My aspirational constitution would so clearly be
different from other people's aspirational constitutions. This simply gets us
back to old debates that we all participated in, and many of us may be bored
with by now, which is, who gets to win when there are competing aspirational
visions? What's the basis of the aspiration? What do you do if somebody
says, "Well, I look to the Declaration," or, "I look to the I Have a Dream
speech," or whatever, as a more authentic source of constitutional law? We
all know those debates. So the aspirational constitution can serve as a method
of sorts, for a given interpreter, but it seems to me wildly unlikely to serve
as the source of social cohesion that some people are looking for out of
constitutional theory.
Tushnet: For individuals, the aspirational orientation can be achieved by
a whole slew of things other than calling it an aspirational constitution. Walt
Whitman and I don't know who-Jane Austen-other people-would be
sources of those kinds of aspirations.
LaRue: Walt Whitman wrote, by the way, that the Declaration was the
Constitution.

50. S. BARBER, supra note 45.
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Hauerwas: Let me put a problem to you both in terms of my situation
today and how it relates to your context. I think it's different from both of
you. I teach in a divinity school that is training people for the Methodist
ministry, to serve a church that I think basically is dead, or will soon be
dead, and probably should be dead. The Methodist bishops, for example,
recently drafted a pastoral on nuclear war in defense of creation, and said
the reason why we have to do away with nuclear weapons is because they
threaten to destroy God's creation. Paul Ramsey and I pointed out to them
that this was not theologically a possibility, that you might destroy the world
but you could not destroy God's creation because then you would destroy
God. 5 ' But our bishops, not being subtle, did not get the point.
One can have a lot of despair about that, but I am sustained by the fact
that I can hope that God is going to do something with that church, and
God knows I continue to teach and train people for the Methodist ministry
even though I have a lot of empirical evidence that it won't mean much. I
mean that, after twenty years at Duke, if I have half of the Methodist
ministers in North Carolina feeling guilty for not serving the eucharist every
Sunday-I know they won't be doing it, but I want them to feel guilty about
it-well, that's the height of my ambition. This is what I want to have done.
That's what I'm about. At least I have a basis for hope in that. What keeps
you going, training people in the law school?
Shaffer: Could I ask you a question about yours, before you switch us
to ours? How can you think of that in institutional terms?
Hauerwas: Like what?
Shaffer: My answer about lawyers is I don't train people to keep America
going. I train people to help people.
Hauerwas: Because the ministry isn't about helping people. The ministry
primarily helps people through preaching the word, serving the sacraments,
building up the Christian community for moral good and sanctification.
That's the reason why you can still be shy and be in the ministry. This is
good. It refers to a task that you've been given to a specifiable institution.
Shaffer: That seems to me a betrayal of the New Testament.
Hauerwas: I appreciate that. I think there's something to that. If the
church doesn't have empirical form it ain't nothing, though, Tom. Your
answer is, "Well, real people helping real people is the empirical form," but
nonetheless the ministry isn't a general helping profession. Neither is the law.
You are going to help people in very specifiable ways. The ministry is meant
to do that. The institution that gives structure to how you help people in
various specifiable ways isn't a very viable institution. I just wonder how you
sustain the activity of training people in the law. What keeps you going doing
that?
Tushnet: Let me answer that with a series of observations in a descending.
order of importance to me personally. I say that because I want to stress
51. P. RAMSEY, SPEAK UP FOR JUST WAR OR PACIFISM: A CRITQUE OF THE UNrED
METHODIST BISHOPS' PArOR.AL LETTER "IN DEFENSE OF CREATON" (1988) (with an "Epilogue"
by Stanley Hauerwas).
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that it may not sound serious when I begin, but it really is serious at the
beginning point. The first three things go together, which are that I've
invested a lot in gaining a certain kind of skill, and I'm very good at it, and
it's fun. I like doing this stuff.
Massie: Why did you make the investment?
Tushnet: Well, it could have been a mistake. I'm willing to say that
twenty years ago I made a mistake, but this is where I am now.
Massie: Why did you make the investment when you made it?
Tushnet: Because I didn't understand that there was no there there. I
thought there was a there there. I found out, over the course of twenty years'
thinking about it, that there isn't. That's an overly strong characterization,
both of my present position, and of why I got into it; but I'm willing to
accept the proposition that it was a mistake at the outset. But it's built up,
and it's fun. I think less important is Tom's proposition that some of the
people, a very small portion of the people who I teach, will help other people
in a better kind of way for my teaching them than for somebody else teaching
them, But the reasons I start with are it's fun, and I've got this investment
in it. I don't think that if I took the marginal influence that I have on this
very small margin of students-I think of it as two or three students a yearI would find it difficult to make that the basis for what I was doing. You
were shaking your head. I don't know whether that's skepticism or what.
Hauerwas: Well, I think fun is a lot. I particularly like my own work. I
tell graduate students any time what you're doing ceases being fun-quit. I
love my work and what I do because I think ultimately it's part of the
conversation that's necessary for Christian people to know how to live more
faithfully. It's very important for me to feel like that's part of my vocation
and that I have real people who say this helps. It's very important that Tom
Shaffer thinks, every once in a while, that something that I do helps him in
that regard, I couldn't go on, I don't think, if it were just fun. So the reason
I was shaking my head is that I was marveling at your ability to do it.
Tushnet: The second part of the last part now doesn't sound that much
different to me from your presentation, because teaching some people so that
they will be better at helping other people in sustaining a morally attractive
form of life, not connected to the Christian tradition, or to the Jewish
tradition, but morallyHauerwas: I suspect it's attracted to the Jewish tradition in the sense
that it's wonderful to knock the big guys down some.
Tushnet: Okay. I'll accept that. That's fair, and I think that's right. That
is, the way I formulate it is that I'm only interested in providing a resource
to resist the drift to the right in law schools, on behalf of a few students on
the margin who my presence will help resist the drift.
Powell: Mark, where does your scholarship fit in? Is it solely under "it's
fun" or does it come under the second alternative?
Tushnet: Oh, I don't know. I guess there's something that I didn't say
in the other things because when I think about teaching, I'm not sure that
it's motivating. The scholarship is saying true things and that seems to me a
worthy thing to do.
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Shaffer: With considerable influence on people who read it.
Tushnet: I could psychologize about myself, and when I do that I don't
think the influence is important because, when I do the psychologizing on
myself, I don't think that I'm influential. Deep down, I don't think that.
Superficially, I think it, but deep down I don't.
Hauerwas: People call me one of the more influential Christian ethicists
in America and I say that that's a little bit like being the best two-bit whore
in a Saturday niiht whorehouse. It doesn't amount to much.
Tushnet: My position is that any sense I have of being influential-I
mean, your characterization is, "Yeah, in an unattractive setting it's influential," but my characterization is that it is an illusion that I'm influential.
Powell: But even if you decided that you weren't, the fact that you're
saying truth is itselfTushnet: Yes, that's right.
Hauerwas: Is that an aesthetic category, "saying truth"?
Tushnet: Oh, God, I don't know. It's the kind of thing you just like to
look at, because it's beautiful and it's self-satisfying. I don't know. I don't
know. I think it's more than that. I think there's something true about truth,
rather than, in addition to, the merely attractive.
Levinson: You're a closet realist, capital R.
Tushnet: Yeah, well, there is that.
Hauerwas: How about you, Sandy?
Levinson: I tried to cover my own approach to teaching in Chapter Five
of ConstitutionalFaith. I think that Mark and I have fairly similar stories
to tell, though mine is complicated by the fact that I went to graduate school
first and took a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard. (My dissertation,
though, was on Holmes and Frankfurter.) I began teaching political science
at Ohio State in 1968 and quickly realized that I had no desire (and perhaps
no ability) to be a mainstream political scientist. Like many people at that
time, I was also greatly upset by what I saw in the university in general and
seriously doubted that I wanted to be an academic. Thus I decided to go to
the Stanford Law School, helped along by a fellowship from the Russell Sage
Foundation. I should admit, though, that I probably assumed that law school
would be an exit from political science and maybe even from the academy
as well. (Had that in fact happened, I hope that I would have felt under an
ethical obligation to return to the Foundation the money they gave me to go
to law school.)
After graduating from Stanford, I clerked for a federal district judge
and, unlike Mark I believe, ventured into legal practice, working for the
Children's Defense Fund. Whatever my initial intentions, though, that practice
lasted less than a year, and I went to Princeton to teach in the Politics
department there for four years before moving to the University of Texas
Law School in 1980. I have, in fact, thought a lot about why I teach in a
law school instead of in a politics department, because there are aspects of
educating students to be professional lawyers that I find disturbing. I don't
know that I have any very good answers as to why I teach law instead of
politics. (Some would say that I do not in fact teach "law instead of politics,"
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but instead teach politics at a law school, but that is another matter.) Before
going on to those answers, I do want to mention one point simply because
it would be gross bad faith to ignore it, and that's the fact that law schools
pay much more than do departments of political science. In addition, no one
who has taught in the regular university can ever fail to be less than
overwhelmed by the sheer level of assistance available at a law school, ranging
from computer facilities to travel budgets.
I would like to think that more than income maximization explains my
remaining at law school, though. What I focus on to justify my teaching law
students rather than graduate students is my ability to participate in a complex
process of citizenship formation being undergone by law students, who I
assume will be playing a variety of leadership roles in their post-law school
lives. I want them to think about certain things that I am firmly convinced
they would not be called upon to think about if they were taught by somenot necessarily all, but at least some-of my colleagues. I think it's politically
important, so I view the teaching as a form of political activity. More so
than teaching undergraduates, even though many of them would be going on
to become lawyers. Certainly teaching graduate students would take a very
different form, because their interests are presumably a much more abstract,
"disinterested" approach to the material, and undergraduates are somewhere
in between. But that is the way, by and large, I try to justify staying within
a law school context.
But I think that it is very problematic to train lawyers. There's a great
deal of tension in that course, invariably, because this brings us also back to
Paul Carrington. 52 I cannot come in and make a very wholehearted presentation on behalf of the legal profession. It's morally perilous. I spend a lot
of time looking at perils. Now I don't think that it must be morally corrupting.
I think if one did have that view of lawyering then there would be no defense
for staying with the enterprise. You ought to blow it up. So, for whatever
reason, including simply serving to justify my staying around and enjoying
the salary, I think that it is possible, though not inevitable, that a good
person can be a good lawyer and vice versa.
Hauerwas: How do you feel-how does Tom, for example-when the
law, as Jeff was reminding us earlier, is inherently coercive and deals with
really putting people under very extreme violence for political and legal
purpose? I mean, isn't your view that you are training people to help people
through that law, through that mechanism, too simple?
Shaffer: It seems to me most of what lawyers do every day doesn't
involve coercion that clearly. Most of what lawyers do every day is fix things
for people, with a certain craftsmanship. One of the things that none of us
said anything about-there are some other law teachers here, maybe one of
them would have-is that craftsmanship, that whole idea of craftsmanship,
might itself be, as MacIntyre said, a source of internal good. A 16t of it has
to do with that and that probably covers most of what's done in law classes,

52. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
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and it probably is one of the things that keeps our gaze averted from the
violence. I find the violence quite disturbing, as a matter of fact. Even most
of litigation is simply getting something settled so people can quit fighting
about it; most of what litigation does is not litigation. All kinds of lawsuits
covering the whole spectrum-ninety-five per cent of them-are settled. That's
what litigators do most of the time...
LaRue: They make deals.
Shaffer: .. .they make deals, and there are some good deals and some
bad deals, and there are some deals where the balance of power is very onesided, and so the coercion and violence is there, but, by and large, I think
it probably is a good thing to make deals for people.
Levinson: I think it does matter what one teaches. The substantive area
of constitutional law is a curious part of the curriculum, for a number of
the reasons we've talked about. Most of our students aren't going to practice
it. I'd be curious-I don't think anybody's done any empirical study to see
if constitutional law cases are settled at the same rate as contracts cases. My
hunch is no, but I don't know what the data would show. This also dovetails
with the required-course question. It is hard to know what to do with
constitutional law in the curriculum. It doesn't fit very well in the function
of law school, of lawyering as you're describing it. I know that Langdell, in
the 1870 curriculum, didn't include constitutional law. I think you could take
constitutional law in your second or third year, but it wasn't one of the great
subjects that you needed to learn the first year. I would feel quite scared, I
think, if I thought that my students might actually go out and practice this
discrete body of law with a living human being instead of a class action.
Hauerwas: So you've remained an academic.
Levinson: Oh, in that sense, sure.
Hauerwas: You really don't want to change your students' lives?
Levinson: In what sense?
Hauerwas: Oh, I mean when I teach students I don't want them to ever
be the same again. I want them to be thoroughly messed up from one of
my courses, in a way that I've changed their questions, how they think about
Christianity, what their ministry's going to be about. I want to change them.
I want to decisively change them.
White: It sounds to me-as if Sandy's marginalities still give him a certain
sense of calling that has that emphasis on change, unless I'm not reading
him correctly. Do you feel a sense of mission?
Levinson: "Mission" is a bit too grandiose. I would like to believe that
this is the way I remain faithful to certain visions of the 1960s, so that I am
not merely an academic in the pejorative sense that led me to go to law
school in 1969, thinking that I was leaving the academy. But "mission"? I
would feel queasy using that word.
White: Prophet?
Levinson: No.
White: But you're a critic?
Levinson: Oh, yeah. And I certainly want students to think about things
in a way that I suspect they haven't thought before. The difficulty is I really
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don't know what I want to happen as a result of this. The problem is that
I don't have a program to sell them.
Tushnet: But Stanley's said this several times now. He starts and maybe
he ends with saying he wants to leave them messed up. That is, he's not
troubled by not having a program. He just wants them messed up.
Hauerwas: I want them to be like me.
Levinson: The image that often comes to mind is this: Would I like my
students to end up like me, or to have a Woody Allen notion, to end up as
neurotic Jewish intellectuals, but not looking for anything at all?
Hauerwas: It's too liberal. I don't like that.
Levinson: Well, that is right. My liberalism would show itself. I can lay
out a variety of problems, and I might suggest at times certain paths we
shouldn't go, but I'm not very confident in the path they should go. In part
because I think there is an ethical question. If I advise them to go certain
paths that I haven't gone-I mean, if I think practicing legal aid law is so
terrific, why am I not doing it? This is the objection I have when Duncan
Kennedy53 promotes the notion that practicing law can be fun. Now, Duncan
simply doesn't practice law andShaffer: Never has?
LaRue: He actually has.
Tushnet: Well, sort ofLevinson: With an asterisk.
Powell: But in fact he didn't.
Hauerwas: I don't want him as my lawyer.
Levinson: That is not to defeat my objection. The fact is I am a very
well paid, very secure legal academic, and so this is where I feel very, very
queasy telling people how they should lead their lives, because I also am
certainly liberal enough to believe that I have a variety of ways that I could
lead my life, if I wanted to. I suspect I could be hired by a number of legal
aid clinics tomorrow. That's why I feel these tensions. It's a combination of
a lack of a systematic program and simply knowing the way I'm leading my
life.
Hauerwas: Right. I'm a Christian, and I get paid pretty well, too, even
in seminary. Let me ask you another question. It's interesting that we're all
about the same age, all came out of the 1960s, all came through some of
the same philosophical developments. We may all have been influenced by
antifoundationist arguments, may all be different, qualified forms of realists.
All of us have been influenced by a lot of the same kind of political theory,
I think. And we all, on the whole, don't have a lot that's constructive to
say to anyone, It's mainly a critique. Is there something we're missing about
what has made us this way? Are there arguments that we should be attending
to more closely, that might provide an important critique of us, that would
provide a more positive stance? I think it's not unimportant that you are
both Jews, and that somehow I found my way into a rather different form
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of Christianity than what I came out of educationally. I'm part of the
Protestant mainstream. I've found myself associated with much more determinative communitarian forms of Christianity than I came from, and I just
wonder: How do you account for these kinds of developments that are going
on? We may just be a blip on the screen.
Beckley: I want to ask you something about your own self-assessment. I
thought you said you didn't have a positive constructive position.
Hauerwas: Well, I do. I do, very strongly, theologically.
Beckley: I think I can tell you what it is.
Hauerwas: The reason why you and Gustafson 4 keep calling me a
sectarian is I don't have a very strong positive account of what I want the
church to do in the world.
Beckley: No, but you have a positive account of what you want the
church to do.
Hauerwas: That's right, that's right.
Beckley: You want it to form character, so that we will be disciples of
Jesus Christ.
Hauerwas: And I even think that would be important politically, if we
could get it going. I think all that's true. But nonetheless that's still pretty
general. I think I can say more to that community than I think Mark in
particular can say. And Sandy says a little more. Right. I think that's true,
and I think I'm saying more than they can say on that, and that's because
I've got a community I think I can address. But nonetheless I just wonder:
How do you account for this, this kind of development? How do you account
for the Crits, the kinds of developments in philosophy represented by Rorty?
MacIntyre is certainly counter-cultural to the mainstream, though he is quite
different than Rorty. In some ways he's much more conservative than Rorty,
socially and politically. I just wonder: Do you have any hunches about how
to account for it. Is it the 1960s?
Tushnet: Well, I think that is part of it. There was a moment of
communitarian vision that opened up, which we all sort of recollect in some
curious kind of way, and, yeah, we can put all sorts of qualifications on it
and so on, but it's part of our common experience.
Hauerwas: I have a thesis about the Vietnamese War. If it hadn't
happened we would have had to invent it, because the sense of community
that many people had discovered, which they had never had before, through
the civil rights campaign- Once you had almost achieved what you wanted
to, you could no longer sustain a sense of community, because you'd won,
and you were to disperse, and instead what you discovered was that you
could fight the war. You could keep that sense of community going in that
way.

54. Gustafson, The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church, and the
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It's very interesting to watch Hayden and Davis. They shifted from civil
rights into the antiwar movement. I'm not in any way denying that they were
equally committed and serious about each, but what was important was that
this allowed them to maintain that sense of community that they discovered
through the civil rights campaign.
Tushnet: I think that's right. Although there's a curious problem of the
relation of whites to the civil rights movement...
Hauerwas: Yes. Oh, no question.
Tushnet:. . .which Freedom Summer 5 sort of nurtured. But I also think,
apart from the location in the history of politics, there is also a location in
the history of thought. These kinds of statements always make me very
uncomfortable because I'm certainly not qualified to defend them; but it sure
looks to me as if, in all sorts of areas, the Enlightenment project of rationality
played itself out. It doesn't work on its own terms. It's been pursued on its
own terms and found inadequate. And that's on an intellectual level, on this
account, why all this stuff is bubbling up in all these other areas. And why
in some ways there can't be anything we're overlooking. What we'd be
overlooking would be some account of rationality on which the inductive
evidence isn't available. But, that's a real global claim, about different areas.
You say MacIntyre says Judaism is a coherent project. What was the second
project?
Powell: Science.
Hauerwas: Yeah. Judaism, Christian theology, and science.
Tushnet: Judaism, Christian theology, and science. My own hunch is
that science is out, too.
Hauerwas: It certainly has maintained itself in a more morally coherent
fashion in the contemporary university than the humanities have. They .still
know how to initiate students within a tradition in a way that those of us in
the humanities do not.
Tushnet: Only because they haven't appreciated what the philosophers of
science have said about their enterprise.
Hauerwas: Well, they don't need to, because they exemplify in practice
what the philosophers of science say you ought to be doing. Scientists are
notoriously bad at describing what it is they do, and so in effect they in
many ways display tradition-bound forms of a rational mode that they
articulate through foundationalist epistemological schemes.
Tushnet: Okay. I think that's right.
Hauerwas: You got any hunches, Sandy?
Levinson: I think that we would be the worst people in the world to ask
what we ought to be listening to, because if we knew we'd be listening to it.
One of the other ways in which I betray my liberalism, or pluralism, is that
I think it is important to have multiple voices to push people to listen to
things they'd just as soon not be aware of. I think people listen to those
voices they think at any given time are worth listening to, and we don't read
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the horoscopes, or any of the other things that we think are nonsense.
Hauerwas: They don't listen to the Ayatollah Khomeini very much either.
Levinson: Right.
Hauerwas: Mark, you don't agree with that, do you? What Sandy just
said?
Tushnet: I'm willing to listen, but you can tell from my tone of voice
that I'm skeptical.
Hauerwas: I mean you're not for multiple conversation partners, per se.
Tushnet: Not per se. I lack sufficient self-confidence to believe that it
will never be the case that somebody will come up with something that would
refute all these positions I've taken, but I am skeptical about it. Because I'm
not so self-confident, I'll listen. There's also a strategic reason for listening
and entertaining these things. I lack social power. I know these things are
going to be said, and there'll be other people who'll be listening to them,
and I ought to be in a position to start explaining why they're wrong, as I
presume they will be. So it's important for me to entertain, to participate in,
the dialogue-both because-who knows?-it might turn out to be right;
and, even if it doesn't turn out to be right, it's strategically important for
me to get it.
Levinson: It's very clear to me, in reading your work over the years,
that, whether you would say you're doing it strategically or otherwise, you
are considerably more willing to defend liberalism than would have been the
case six or seven years ago. I think you are turning slowly but surely-or
not that slowly but certainly surely-into a very important critic of republicanism. And one of the things that is important about that is that it's some
of our mutual friends who are the republicans. I think that five years ago,
if people had been asked to predict where Tushnet would line up, it would
have been with the republicans, and so you in fact listened toTushnet: But I can identify that with being Jewish. That's pretty straightforward.
Levinson: I realize that. But that too is a part of yourself that you
weren't expressing...
Tushnet: That's right. That's right.
Levinson: ... six or seven years ago. So in fact, simply because we do
live in a kind of pluralist universe, whatever our ideal political theories might
be, lots of communication does take place, and, even if we assume that a
lot of stuff isn't going to be very enlightening, we find ourselves shifting
views and taking certain things seriously that we would not have anticipated
taking seriously. I also agree with Mark that a lot of stuff that we expected
to be worthless is.
Hauerwas: But in fact you two still represent very much a minority
within the legal profession, in terms of academics, don't you? And I certainly
represent a very small way of viewing how one does theology.
Shaffer: But you're influential.
Hauerwas: I do like to think that influence is not that you have people
agree with you. It's that you can set the terms of the debate, and I'm
beginning to do that.
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Tushnet: In your case, that's not easy.
Hauerwas:But I mean you all are still very much a small minority within
theTushnet: I think that's right.
Hauerwas: That's because the law is such a powerful establishment tool.
Tushnet" Before going further, I want to say that "minority" ' is true. I
understand the tension between my saying that and what appear to be the
epistemological positions that I am otherwise committed to. I understand the
tension, but I don't quite know what to do about it. But at least I know
there is a difficulty. I start by saying that, so it doesn't matter.
So we're a minority. So what? Having said that, it is, I think, the case
that in the law a lot depends on, at some level, what happens in politics, in
the next election, to put it in the crudest terms. At the moment the struggle
for defining the terms of the debate is basically between the right-wing, law
and economics people and the left-wing, Critical Legal Studies people, and
because of politics, and the relationship between law and politics, a lot has
happened. The structure of the debate has been defined over the past decade
largely by right-wing law and economics. But I don't think that's inevitable.
I think the votes are still out.
Hauerwas: Even if the Democrats win, I don't think you're going to be
appointed attorney general.
Tushnet: But I think the issue will then be what do left-liberals, the Yale
Law School folks, do? How did they respond to their being in bad faith
about their commitment to the law? And they can move either way. Currently
at Yale, they're moving to the right, but they don't really want to do that,
deep down, because of their political commitment. If the political space opens
up for them to start exercising the kind of power they want to exercise, they
may resolve the problem of bad faith by moving to the left, which is where
our stuff is defining the issues. That's a very rosy scenario and I want to
emphasize that the more important thing is the first.
Levinson: The only thing I would add is that it's a strange sort of
minority, because in fact it is very, very well represented at several of the
elite schools. Stanford...
Tushnet: Two out of the four.
Levinson: ... has a dean now-Paul Brest-which among other things
also disconfirms the proposition of the Harvard Law School that having
Critical Legal Studies people on the faculty inevitably leads to chaos. I think
that's the statement of the Harvard Law School. Be that as it may, that's a
separate argument.
I think it is significant that Mark's casebook has become the leading
one. It's not a Crit casebook. On the other hand, it certainly presents more
of that perspective than Gunther,5 6 so a lot of people who don't identify at
all with Critical Legal Studies, or are not identified-maybe they secretly
identify without being identified by others-for some reason are choosing to
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expose their students to, and themselves to start learning this stuff, about
republicanism-what you have plugged into-and it's also coupled with the
fact that some people have not gotten jobs because they are identified with
Critical Legal Studies. Where do you have much more of a classic majority
oppression of minorities? But it doesn't fit your classic definition of a
minority.
Hauerwas: One of the things that I picked up from what you were
saying, about what sustains the business, is that you still have a very strong
sense about what it means to have the vocation of the intellectual, and how
that gives you a certain sense of vocation-that you are going to go forward,
irrespective of influence or success.
Tushnet: I think that's right. I don't often think of myself in those terms,
but I think it is true that the best description of me would be as an intellectual.

